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AB S TRAC T 
T h i s  r e p o r t  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h e  U.S. Congress 
h a s  u s e d  ( o r  h a s  c o n s i d e r e d  u s i n g )  t o  i n f l u e n c e  U.S. p o l i c y  towards  t h e  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  development banks (MDBs) o r  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
MDBs themse lves .  One c a t e g o r y  o f  laws s p e c i f i e s  a c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a -  
t i v e s  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  a t  t h e  MDBs o r  e x e c u t i v e  b ranch  o f f i c i a l s  must t a k e  
i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  A second c a t e g o r y  s e e k s  t o  use  t h e  "power o f  t h e  
purse"  t o  make t h e  MDBs t a k e  ( o r  f o r e s w e a r )  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s .  The r e p o r t  
d i s c u s s e s  some o f  t h e  arguments  i n  f a v o r  and i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  two t y p e s  
o f  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  and i t  i d e n t i f i e s  some o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
e f f e c t  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and s u c c e s s .  The r e p o r t  p r o v i d e s  a  f u l l  
l i s t  o f  t h e  laws t h a t  govern  U. S. pol  i c y  towards  t h e  MDBs.  It shows how much 
money t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  MDBs i n  t h e  p a s t  decade .  It 
a l s o  o u t l i n e s  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p r o c e s s  and t h e  way t h e  MDBs r e c e i v e  funds  from 
donor  c o u n t r i e s  such  a s  t h e  United S t a t e s .  

MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS : 
LEGIS LATION AFFECTING U. S. PART ICIPATION 
The United S t a t e s  i s  a member o f  four  m u l t i l a t e r a l  development banks 
(MDBS): t h e  k r l d  Bank, t h e  Af r ican  Development Bank (AFDB), t h e  Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) , and t h e  Inter-American Development Bank ( IDB) . The 
banks  make l o a n s  t o  promote growth and e c o n m i c  change i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
In 1986, t h e y  approved new l o a n s  t o t a l l i n g  $23.7 b i l l i o n .  - 1/ The United S t a t e s  
i s  t h e  l a r g e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  a l l  bu t  t h e  Af r ican  i n s t i t u t i o n .  - 21 The 
volume of  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks h a s  grown s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
i n  t h e  p a s t  two decades .  I n  f i s c a l  1967, t h e  United S t a t e s  paid  i n  $374 
m i l l i o n  t o  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I n  f i s c a l  1977, t h e  number r o s e  t o  
number r o s e  t o  $655.13 m i l l i o n .  In  f i s c a l  1987, t h e  United S t a t e s  provided 
$949.33 m i l l i o n  i n  paid i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
As t h e  l e v e l  of U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e  MDB program h a s  
become more c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  There  h a s  been  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
d e b a t e  about t h e  c a n p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  MDBs '  l o a n  program, t h e  k i n d s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  
t h e  banks have f i n a n c e d ,  and t h e  amounts t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r i e s  have 
r e c e i v e d .  From t ime t o  t i m e ,  Members o f  Congress have proposed amendments 
t o  pending MDB l e g i s l a t i o n  which uould r e g u l a t e  U . S .  p o l i c y  i n  s p e c i f i c  ways 
1/ For f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  on  t h e  l a r g e s t  o f  t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s e e  
CRS c p o r t  86-7693 The Wbrld Bank: E igh teen  Quest ions  and Answers. 
21 I n  t h e  World Bank, t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  19.88 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  v o t e  
i n  t h g  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bank f o r  Recons t ruc t ion  and Development ( IBRD) , 29.95 
p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development A s s o c i a t i o n  ( IDA), and 27.77 per-  
c e n t  i n  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Finance Corpora t ion  ( LFC.) In  t h e  Asian Develop- 
ment Bank (ADB) , t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  13.70 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  v o t e ,  w h i l e  i n  
t h e  Inter-American D e v e l o p e n t  ( I D B ) ,  i t s  v o t i n g  s h a r e  i s  34.51 p e r c e n t .  I n  
t h e  A f r i c a n  Development Bank (AFDB), t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  5.69 p e r c e n t  o f  
t h e  v o t e  i n  t h e  Bank i t s e l f  and 5.82 percen t  i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  Development Fund 
(AFDF.) I n  t h e  AFDB, N i g e r i a  and Egypt have l a r g e r  v o t i n g  s h a r e s  t h a n  t h e  
United S t a t e s ,  while i n  t h e  AFDF, ~ a p a n ' s  a h a r e  i s  l a r g e r .  
o r  s e e k  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  M D B s '  p o l i c i e s  o r  p rocedures .    he United S t a t e s  
became a  member o f  e a c h  MDB a s  a r e s u l t  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  adopted by Congress .  
P e r i o d i c a l l y ,  new l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  p resen ted  t o  Congress t o  a u t h o r i z e  and 
a p p r o p r i a t e  money f o r  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  new funding MDB p l a n s  .) 
Congress h a s  used two b a s i c  approaches  i n  i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  MDB 
p o l i c y  o r  o p e r a t i o n s .  One h a s  involved t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  
s t a t e s  what U.S. p o l i c y  s h a l l  b e  o r  how t h e  United S t a t e s  s h a l l  use  i t s  "vo ice  
and v o t e  i n  t h e  MDBs i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n s .  The o t h e r  has involved t h e  
p o s s i b l e  use  of  t h e  "power o f  t h e  purse"  -- v a r y i n g  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  U.S. pay- 
ment o r  c o n d i t i o n i n g  t h e  way t h e  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  l e v e r a g e  
o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  MDB o p e r a t i o n s .  
Th i s  paper  reviews t h e  record  f o r  b o t h  t y p e s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  i t  
i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  laws which have been adopted s p e c i f y i n g  o r  d i r e c t i n g  U.S. p o l i c y  
i n  t h e ' m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s .  Second, t h e  paper  reviews t h e  v a r i o u s  ways 
Members o f  Congress have sought  t o  use  t h e  "power of t h e  purse"  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  MDB program i n  p a r t i c u l a r  ways. It a l s o  d i s c u s s e s  p o s s i b l e  arguments 
f a v o r i n g  and opposing t h e s e  v a r i o u s  s t e p s .  
I. LAWS GOVERNING U .S . POLICY AND U .S. PARTICIPATION 
I N  THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
The mu1 t i l a t e r a l  development banks a r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o d i e s ,  n o t  U.  S.  
Government a g e n c i e s .  I f  Congress i s  concerned about a  p a r t i c u l a r  a s p e c t  of  
t h e  HDB program, i t  cannot  move ( a s  i t  can wi th  U.S. Government programs) t o  
r e c t i f y  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by  adop t ing  laws which r e q u i r e  t h e  a g e n c i e s  t o  o p e r a t e  
i n  s p e c i f i c  ways o r  p r o h i b i t  c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t i e s .  
The United S t a t e s  does  have f u l l  l e g a l  c o n t r o l ,  however, o v e r  t h e  way i t s  
v o t e s  a r e  c a s t  and i t s  i n f l u e n c e  used i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s .  By l a w ,  
t h e  power t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  t h e  MDBs i s  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  and t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  d e l e g a t e d  t h i s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
t h e  T r e a s u r y .  - 3/ Congress h a s  adopted numerous laws which s u p e r s e d e  t h i s  
p rocedure  and d i r e c t  what U.S. p o l i c y  s h a l l  be i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  A l i s t  
o f  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i s  provided i n  appendix  1, page 25. The b a s i c  laws 
govern ing  U.S. membership i n  t h e  MDBs a r e  l i s t e d  i n  appendix  2 ,  page 3 3 .  
Some of  t h e s e  laws r e q u i r e  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  p rov ide  Congress wi th  
c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  - 4/ For example,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  t o  c o n s u l t  
wi th  Congress b e f o r e  b e g i n n i n g  n e g o t i a t i o n s  wi th  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  about  new 
MDB fund ing  p l a n s .  It i s  a l s o  supposed t o  r e p o r t  on whether t h e  MDBs have  
t a k e n  c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  a c t i o n .  For example, Congress i s  t o  b e  informed 
about  l o a n s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  poor hunan r i g h t s  r e c o r d s  o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
MDB a i d  t a r g e t e d  f o r  a i d  t o  t h e  needy.  
Some o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  g u i d e l i n e s  s t a t e  p o l i c y  o r  s i g n a l  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
concern  about  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  For example,  Congress h a s  s a i d  t h a t  i t  s h a l l  
b e  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  encourage  MDB l e n d i n g  t o  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
3/ B r e t t o n  Woods Agreements A c t ,  s e c t i o n  4 ,  a s  r e v i s e d  b y  s e c t i o n s  l ( a )  
and 3Ta) o f  ~ e o r ~ a n i z a t i o n  P lan  No. 4 o f  1965,  e f f e c t i v e  J u l y  27,  1965,  30 
F.R. 9353. Execu t ive  Order 11269, February  14,  1966, 31 F.R. 2813. 
4 /  Curren t  l a w  r e q u i r e s  t h e  ~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  make 19 s e p a r a t e  r e p o r t s  t o  
c o n g r e s s  on 29 i s s u e s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  MDBs. Eleven a r e  r e p o r t s  which a r e  f i l e d  
on a  p e r i o d i c  b a s i s .  The r e s t  a r e  e x p l a n a t o r y  r e p o r t s  which a r e  t o  be  f i l e d  
o n l y  i f  c e r t a i n  e v e n t s  o c c u r .  In most  c a s e s ,  t h e  Adin in i s t r a t ion  h a s  complied 
wi th  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  t h a t  i t  p rov ide  t h e  r e q u i r e d  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The r e p o r t  o f  
t h e  Na t iona l  Advisory Council  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary and F i n a n c i a l  P o l i c y  
(NAc), f o r  example,  i s  a  comprehensive  document ( p u b l i s h e d  a n n u a l l y )  which 
p r o v i d e s  Congress w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d a t a  on U.S. p o l i c y  and MDB o p e r a t i o n s .  
I n  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  n o t  c a n p l i e d  wi th  t h e  t e rms  o f  t h e  
r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t .  S i n c e  1970, f o r  example ,  n o  r e p o r t  h a s  e v e r  been f i l e d  
( a s  r e q u i r e d  by P.L.  91-599, s e c .  3 1 [ 1 ] )  showing t h e  s t a t u s  o f  p r o j e c t s  funded 
by p r e v i o u s l y  approved MDB l o a n s .  Some o f  t h e  r e p o r t s  on MDB performance i n  
t a r g e t i n g  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  needy ( r e q u i r e d  by  P.L. 95-118, s e c .  1103) were 
f i l e d  b u t  none provided any o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  l aw.  
pursue  development s t r a t e g i e s  des igned  t o  meet b a s i c  human needs  and growth- 
wi th -equ i ty .  Congress h a s  s a i d  i t  would b e  U.S. p o l i c y  t o  promote t h e  i n t e g r a -  
t i o n  of women and t o  encourage more MDB l e n d i n g  f o r  p r o j e c t s  which aim a t  
meet ing d a n e s t i c  food needs  r a t h e r  than  encouraging t h e  e x p o r t  o f  c e r t a i n  
p o l i t i c a l l y - s e n s i t i v e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduc t s .  Congress h a s  a l s o  used i t s  
MDB laws a s  media through which i t  can announce i t s  concerns  about i s s u e s  
such a s  Taiwan's s t a t u s  i n  t h e  ADB, t h e  need f o r  more a i d  t o  A f r i c a ,  o r  t h e  
l e v e l  of MDB a i d  t o  c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s .  As a  t e c h n i c a l  l e g a l  m a t t e r ,  t h e r e  may 
be  some doubt  whether t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s  of  p o l i c y  have a  c o n t r o l l i n g  e f f e c t  on 
t h e  day-to-day d e t a i l s  o f  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  banks .  Some a n a l y s t s  a rgue  
t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  of p o l i c y  o r  concern  a r e  no t  t h e  same t h i n g  a s  d i r e c t i v e 8  t h a t  
t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  must do  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  These may 
be  important  i n d i c a t o r s ,  however, of  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  about f u t u r e  
t r e n d s  i n  t h e  MDB program. 
Some o f  t h e  laws r e q u i r e  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  b ranch  t o  c o n s u l t  wi th  o t h e r  coun- 
t r i e s  o r  t o  propose t h e  adop t ion  o f  c e r t a i n  k inds  o f '  r e s o l u t i o n s  i n  MDB forums, 
For example,  t h e  U. S.  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  t o  s e e k  c l e a r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  
o r  changes i n  t h e  banks '  a r t i c l e s  of  agreement so a s  t o  encourage more l e n d i n g  
t o  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  f a v o r a b l e  r e c o r d s  on b a s i c  human needs and l e s s  l e n d i n g  t o  
c o u n t r i e s  with unfavorab le  r e c o r d 8  on human r i g h t s .  
Some o f  t h e  laws a l s o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  banks 
oppose any  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  HDB a s s i s t a n c e  t o  c o u n t r i e s  i n  c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s .  
The United S t a t e s  must  use  i t s  " v o i c e  and v o t e , "  f o r  example,  t o  oppose MDB 
l e n d i n g  t o  c o u n t r i e s  wi th  poor h m a n  r i g h t s  r e c o r d s ,  t o  c o u n t r i e s  which exprop- 
r i a t e  U.S. owned p r i v a t e  inves tment  wi thou t  adequa te  compensat ion,  o r  t o  coun- 
t r i e s  which f a i l  t o  t a k e  adequate  s t e p s  t o  prevent  t h e  expor t  of i l l e g a l  d r u g s  
t o  t h e  United S t a t e s .  The U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  MDBs must a l s o  oppose 
a l l  l o a n s  f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  e x p o r t  of  palm o i l ,  s u g a r ,  c i t r u s ,  c o p p e r ,  o r  
any o t h e r  product  i n  s u r p l u s  i n  world marke t s  i f  t h a t  o u t p u t  would h u r t  U .  S. 
p roducers  o f  c a n p e t i n g  p r o d u c t s .  Congress h a s  passed some o f  t h e s e  i n j u n c t i o n s  
more than  o n c e .  
THE "POKER OF THE PURSE" AND U.S. 
POLICY TOWARDS THE MDBS 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  makes i t s  recommendat i o n s  t o  Congress a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  
amounts i t  b e l i e v e s  shou ld  b e  a u t h o r i z e d  and a p p r o p r i a t e d  f o r  new U.S. c o n t r i -  
b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  MDBs.  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  us ing  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  s p e c i f y i n g  p o l i c y  
and c o n t r o l i n g  t h e  U . S .  v o t e ,  Members o f  Congress h a s  a l s o  sometimes sought  
t h e  enactment  o f  s p e c i f i c  l i m i t s  o r  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  way t h o s e  funds  c a n  b e  
c o n t r i b u t e d  o r  used .  The i d e a  i s  t o  u s e  t h e  "pwer o f  t h e  purse"  a s  a  way o f  
g e t t i n g  l e v e r a g e  o r  o f  o t h e r w i s e  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  MDBs. 
The C o n t r i b u t i o n  P r o c e s s  
Before  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  ways members o f  Congress have sough t  t o  use  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  p rocess  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  p o l i c i e s  o r  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m u l t i -  
l a t e r a l  b a n k s ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  b a s i c  p rocedures  which occur  
when t h e  United S t a t e s  makes c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks .  There a r e  
s p e c i f i c  s t e p s  and s t a g e s  where l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  migh t  have an e f f e c t .  
A. N e g o t i a t i o n .  Every few y e a r s ,  a s  i t  beccmes e v i d e n t  t h a t  e a c h  o f  t h e  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  will need new f u n d s ,  t h e  MDB donor  c o u n t r i e s  n e g o t i a t e  new 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreements  by  which t h e y  a l l  a g r e e  t o  c o o p e r a t e  i n  a  p lan  for  
expanding t h e  MDBs '  r e s o u r c e s .  T h e i r  s e a n s  f o r  accompl i sh ing  t h i s  i s  a  r e s o -  
l u t i o n  o f  t h e  Board of  Governors o f  t h e  MDB under d i s c u s s i o n .  In  t h e  d r a f t  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  o t h e r  donor  c o u n t r i e s  a g r e e  on t h e  s i z e  
of  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  amounts which a r e  t o  come from each  donor  
c o u n t r y ,  and o t h e r  terms o f  t h e  new funding p l a n .  Once t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
t h e  donor c o u n t r i e s  have agreed upon t h e i r  proposed p l a n ,  t h e y  submit  i t  £or 
t h e  formal approva l  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  governments.  In  most c a s e s ,  because  
t h e  U.S. v o t i n g  s h a r e  i n  t h e  MDB i s  so l a r g e ,  t h e  formal consen t  of  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  i s  needed b e f o r e  t h e  new funding p l a n  can l e g a l l y  go  i n t o  e f f e c t .  
B .  A u t h o r i z a t i o n .  The b a s i c  r u l e s  governing U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a r e  s e t  
f o r t h  i n  t h e  Acts  o f  Congress ( t h e  B r e t t o n  Woods Agreements Ac t ,  e t c . )  whereby 
t h e  United S t a t e s  took  membership i n  each  m u l t i l a t e r a l  agency. These laws a l l  
s t i p u l a t e  t h a t ,  b e f o r e  t h e  United S t a t e s  can f o r m a l l y  a g r e e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
a new fund ing  p lan  which would r e q u i r e  U .  S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  an Act o f  Congress 
i s  needed t o  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  U.S. Governor ( S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury)  t o  v o t e  
f o r  t h e  MDB r e s o l u t i o n .  Congress must a l s o  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  
funds  needed t o  pay f o r  t h e  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  . t h e  new MDB fund ing  p l a n .  
The a u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  U. S. Governor t o  v o t e  and t h e  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
funds a r e  u s u a l l y  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  same l e g i s l a t i o n .  Once a  s u f f i c i e n t  number 
of c o u n t r i e s  have agreed t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  proposed MDB fund ing  p l a n ,  i t  
l e g a l l y  g o e s  i n t o  e f f e c t .  The donor  c o u n t r i e s  may then  inform t h e  MDB o f  
t h e i r  p lan  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  s p e c i f i c  amounts i n  suppor t  of  t h e  fund ing  p l a n .  
C .  A p p r o p r i a t i o n .  Each y e a r ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s k s  Congress t o  approp- 
r i a t e  money t o  meet t h e  U .  S .  s h a r e  f o r  MDB fund ing  p lans  p r e v i o u s l y  a u t h o r i z e d  
by Congress .  T h i s  i s  done through t h e  f o r e i g n  o p e r a t i o n s  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  l e g i s -  
l a t i o n .  Table 2 shows t h e  amounts r e q u e s t e d  by t h e  ~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and a p p r o p r i -  
a t e d  by Congress f o r  t h e  MDBs i n  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e .  
D .  Commitment. Once Congress h a s  a p p r o p r i a t e d  f u n d s ,  t h e  U.S. Governor 
t r a n s m i t s  a  formal p ledge t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  MDB, commiting t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  
p rov ide  a  s p e c i f i c  sum o f  money a s  p a r t  of t h e  U.S. s h a r e  i n  a  s p e c i f i e d  MDB 
fund ing  p l a n .  Since  1977, Congress h a s  s t i p u l a t e d  i n  i t s  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  a c t s  
t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h e  U.S. Governor can  v o t e  f o r  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  Board of Gov- 
e r n o r s  t h a t  s a y s  t h e  United S t a t e s  and o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  c e r t a i n  
amounts, t h e  U.S. Governor cannot  make formal commitments u n t i l  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
funds  a r e  a c t u a l l y  approved i n  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
In  t h e  c a s e  o f  I D A  and t h e  o t h e r  MDB c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n  programs, t h e  MDB 
proceeds  ( a f t e r  i t  h a s  r e c e i v e d  t h e  formal p ledge)  t o  make l o a n  c m m i t m e n t s  t o  
c o u n t r i e s  f o r  a i d  p r o j e c t s  which a r e  t o  b e  f inanced us ing  t h o s e  c o n t r i b u t e d  
f u n d s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  donor c o u n t r i e s  a l l  make t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  
MDB's c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n  programs a t  about  t h e  same t i m e .  I f  a  major  c o u n t r y ,  
such a s  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  f a i l s  t o  make i t s  payments on t ime o r  i n  t h e  r i g h t  
amount, t h e  MDB rep len i shment  p l a n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  drawn i n  such a  way t h a t  t h e  
o t h e r  d o n o r s  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  suspend o r  d i m i n i s h  t h e i r  own c o n t r i b u t i o n s  cor-  
r e s p o n d i n g l y .  The United S t a t e s  makes i t s  formal commitment t o  t h e  MDB i n  t h e  
form o f  non-nego t iab le ,  n o n - i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g ,  l e t t e r s  o f  c r e d i t .  
The l i n k  between t h e  formal p l e g e  and f u t u r e  MDB l e n d i n g  i s  l e s s  d i r e c t  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  IBRD and t h e  o t h e r  o r d i n a r y  c a p i t a l  (market  r a t e  l o a n )  programs. 
The MDBs f i n a n c e  t h e i r  market  r a t e  l o a n  o p e r a t i o n s  m a i n l y  w i t h  funds  borrowed 
i n  world c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  The c a p i t a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  by t h e  United S t a t e s  and 
t h e  o t h e r  member c o u n t r i e s  s e r v e  a s  backing f o r  t h e  MDBs' commercial bor rowings .  
+ 
Once t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  make t h e  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  t o  new c a p i t a l  s t o c k  planned 
i n  t h e  new MDB funding r e s o l u t i o n s ,  t h e  MDBs a r e  a b l e  t o  make new l o a n  commit- 
ments t o  borrower  c o u n t r i e s  and t o  borrow t h e  n e c e s s a r y  money t o  f i n a n c e  t h o s e  
new l o a n  commitments. The U.S. pledge  f o r  a new MDB o r d i n a r y  c a p i t a l  funding 
p lan  t a k e s  t h e  form of  a  s u b s c r i p t i o n  t o  new c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  A t  t h e  t ime  o f  
s u b s c r i p t i o n ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  pays t o  t h e  bank a  smal l  f r a c t i o n  ( u s u a l l y  10 
p e r c e n t  o r  l e s s )  o f  t h e  f u l l  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s t o c k .  The r e s t  i s  s u b s c r i b e d  on a  
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" c a l l a b l e "  b a s i s ,  no t  s u b j e c t  t o  payment u n l e s s  t h e  MDB needs  t h e  money b e c a u s e  
d e f a u l t s  by  i t s  bor rowers  r e n d e r  i t  i n c a p a b l e  o f  mee t ing  i t s  own f i n a n c i a l  
o b l  i g a t  i o n s .  
In  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  new c a p i t a l  i n c r e a s e  p l a n s  d o  n o t  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  member 
c o u n t r i e s  a l l  make t h e i r  s u b c r i p t i o n s  a t  t h e  same t i m e .  I f  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  
s u b s c r i b e s  l e s s  a l l  i t  i s  a l lowed t o  s u b s c r i b e  under t h e  t e rms  o f  a  new MDB 
c a p i t a l  expans ion  p l a n ,  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  cou ld  buy t h e i r  s t o c k  anyway. The 
MDB would n o t  b e  l e g a l l y  p reven ted  from borrowing funds  b u t ,  a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  
m a t t e r ,  t h e  amount i t  c o u l d  borrow would b e  l e s s  t h a n  o t h e r w i s e .  ( ~ o n d h o l d e r s  
n o t e  how much o f  t h e  MDB c a l l a b l e  c a p i t a l  which s t a n d s  s u r e t y  f o r  t h e i r  l o a n s  
was s u b s c r i b e d  by t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s . )  The 
l i m i t i n g  e f f e c t  o f  a  reduced U.S. s u b s c r i p t i o n  would b e  f e l t  on  t h e  l e n d i n g  
s i d e  o f  MDB o p e r a t i o n s .  The MDB c h a r t e r s  s a y  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  MDB l o a n s  
o u t s t a n d i n g  canno t  exceed t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  s u b s c r i b e d  c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  A d r o p  
i n  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  U.S. s u b s c r i p t i o n  would b r i n g  about a  one-for-one r e d u c t i o n  
i n  t h e  amount t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  agency c a n  l o a n  i n  f u t u r e  y e a r s .  
E .  Disbursement .  The United S t a t e s  d i s b u r s e s  money from t h e  Treasury  
t o  pay f o r  t h e  pa id - in  p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  c a p i t a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  abou t  t h e  same 
t ime i t  s u b s c r i b e s  t o  them. The money t o  pay f o r  o t h e r  U.  S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
i s  h e l d  i n  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  however,  u n t i l  t h e  mu1 t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  a c t u a l l y  
need i t  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e i r  l o a n s .  When t h e  M D B s  ag ree  t o  f i n a n c e  a  development 
p r o j e c t ,  t h e y  d o  n o t  r e l e a s e  money r i g h t  away. R a t h e r ,  t h e y  open a  l i n e  o f  
c r e d i t  a g a i n s t  which t h e y  make d i s b u r s e m e n t s  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  work on t h e  p r o j e c t  
a s  i t  p r o g r e s s e s .  In many c a s e s ,  i t  may t a k e  a s  long  a s  8 t o  10 y e a r s  f o r  t h e  
MDB t o  o u t l a y  f u l l y  a l l  t h e  funds  covered b y  t h e  o r i g i n a l  l o a n  commitment.  As 
t h e  MDB needs  money t o  pay t h e  b i l l s  f o r  an a c t i v i t y  covered  by  i t s  l o a n s ,  i t  
c a l l s  on t h e  Treasury  t o  c o n v e r t  t h e  U.S. l e t t e r s  o f  c r e d i t  i n t o  money. I t  i s  
a t  t h a t  po in t  t h a t  t h e  U.S. T r e a s u r y  d i s b u r s e s  funds  t o  cover  t h e  U.S. c o n t r i -  
b u t i o n  t o  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  agency which Congress a u t h o r i z e d  and a p p r o p r i a t e d  
s e v e r a l  yea r s  e a r l i e r .  
Use o f  U.S. C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  I n f l u e n c e  MDB O p e r a t i o n s  
There a r e  a  number of p o s s i b l e  methods by which Congress might s e e k  t o  use  
t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  p rocess  a s  a  v e h i c l e  f o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o r  p o l i c i e s  
o f  t h e  MDBs . In  t h e  main ,  Congress h a s  not  adopted t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s .  A few, 
however, have become law.  The fo l lowing  d i s c u s s i o n  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  v a r i o u s  
t y p e s  o f  a c t i o n s  which have been o r  cou ld  be used.  
A .  R e s t r i c t  Pending A u t h o r i z i t i o n  Reques t s .  During i t s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
MDB a u t h o r i z i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  Congress could  c u t  t h e  amount b e i n g  approved f o r  
f u t u r e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  t o  p e n a l i z e  t h e  MDB f o r  p a s t  l o a n s  which Congress d i s -  
approved.  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i f  Congress were concerned about f u t u r e  MDB o p e r a t i o n s ,  
i t  could  s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  t h e  U.S. Governor cou ld  no t  v o t e  f o r  t h e  MDB fund ing  
r e s o l u t i o n  and no U.S. funds  c o u l d  b e  c o n t r i b u t e d  u n t i l  t h e  fund ing  plan were 
amended t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  agency ' s  f u t u r e  a c t i v i t i e s .  To d a t e ,  no 
Members o f  Congress have proposed a c t i o n  o f  t h i s  s o r t  ( p a s t  p roposa l s  t o  c u t  MDB 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n  l e v e l s  have been j u s t i f i e d  on budge ta ry  -- not  p o l i c y  -- g r o u n d s ) .  
s e p a r a t e  methods have been i d e n t i f i e d  h e r e ,  one d e a l i n g  wi th  p a s t  MDB 
l o a n s  and a n o t h e r  focus ing  on p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  MDB p r a c t i c e s .  An argument i n  
f avor  o f  c u t t i n g  t h e  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  would hold t h a t  t h i s  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  way 
f o r  s i g n a l i n g  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i s p l e a s u r e  wi th  p a s t  MDB performance.  I f  t h e  MDB 
made a  c e r t a i n  amount o f  l o a n s  which Congress d i s l i k e s ,  then  t h e  U.S. s h a r e  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e  funding p l a n  could  b e  c u t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  p e n a l i z e  t h e  
MDB f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p a s t  p r a c t i c e .  As a  coun te ra rgument ,  t h e  opponents  might 
argue t h a t  c u t s  of  t h i s  s o r t  might be  p u n i t i v e  bu t  t h e y  d o  not  a f f e c t  what t h e  
MDB w i l l  d o  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  In a n y  c a s e ,  opponen t s  might  s a y ,  Congress shou ld  
l o o k  a t  t h e  MDB's t o t a l  program -- not  s imply  a  few l o a n s  -- when i t  c a l c u l a t e s  
t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h e  United S t a t e s  d e r i v e s  from i t s  c o n t i n u e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  agency.  
The a l t e r n a t i v e  approach -- a  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  MDB fund ing  r e s o l u t i o n  
be  amended t o  p r o h i b i t  t h e  bank from making c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  l o a n s  -- would 
have a  more d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on MDB f u t u r e  o p e r a t i o n s .  The a d v o c a t e s  o f  t h i s  
approach  might  hold  t h a t  t h i s  o f f e r s  a  c l e a r  and c a n d i d  way f o r  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  t o  e x p r e s s  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n s  and t h e  method i s  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  formal  
p rocedures  of  t h e  MDB program. The MDBs a r e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e y  s a y ,  
and they  shou ld  b e  a b l e  t o  respond e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  t h e i r  members' p o l i c y  con- 
c e r n s .  The opponents  might  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  approach  v i o l a t e s  t h e  s p i r i t  and 
l e t t e r  o f  t h e  MDB c h a r t e r s .  The c h a r t e r s  r e q u i r e  t h e  MDBs t o  b a s e  t h e i r  l o a n  
d e c i s i o n s  on economic c r i t e r i a ,  and t h e  c h a r t e r s  p r o h i b i t  them f r m  d i s c r  irninat- 
ing  a g a i n s t  c o u n t r i e s  on p o l i t i c a l  g rounds .  The opponents  might  a l s o  a rgue  
t h a t ,  j u s t  a s  a  l a w  canno t  v i o l a t e  t h e  U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  MDB Board of Gov- 
e r n o r s '  funding r e s o l u t i o n s  c a n n o t  v i o l a t e  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  MDB c h a r t e r s .  
AS a  n e g o t i a t i n g  s t r a t e g y ,  t h e y  might  a d d ,  t h i s  approach i s  a l s o  wrong because  
i t  i s  t o o  i n f l e x i b l e .  Unless  Congress were t o  amend i t s  d i r e c t i v e  by f u t u r e  
l a w ,  t h e  c r i t i c s  might  a r g u e ,  t h e  U.S. n e g o t i a t o r s  c o u l d  not  ag ree  t o  c o m p r m i s e  
p l a n s  which m e t  b a s i c  U.S.  c o n c e r n s  b u t  f e l l  s h o r t  o f  t h e  g o a l  s t i p u l a t e d  i n  
l aw.  
B. No f u r t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  One proposa l  h a s  urged t h a t  Congress b a r  any 
f u t u r e  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  MDB fund ing  p l a n s  i f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  t a k e  
c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i e d  s t e p s .  In 1980, t h e  House adopted an amendment by  Represen ta -  
t i v e  ~ e r a l d  Solomon t o  an  Asian Developnent Bank a u t h o r i z a t i o n  a c t  b a r r i n g  any 
f u t u r e  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  ADB i f  Taiwan was excluded from membership.  
 he f i n a l  Act s t i p u l a t e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  would r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  
f u t u r e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  ADB i f  Taiwan were exc luded . )  I n  1987, Sena to r  
Symms h a s  proposed ( i n  S. 220) t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  should  b e  b a r r e d  b y  law 
from p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  any f u t u r e  MDB funding agreements i f  t h e  MDBs made 
c e r t a i n  l o a n s  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  p roduc t ion  o f  commodities o r  m i n e r a l s .  
As an argument i n  f a v o r  o f  t h i s  approach ,  one  might i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  
a t  hand i s  v e r y  impor tan t  and c l a i m s  about p o s s i b l e  i n j u r y  t o  t h e  MDB program 
should  no t  p r e v e n t  t h e  United S t a t e s  from seek ing  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  o f  c u r r e n t  
wrongs. One cou ld  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  l i t t l e  a c t u a l  i n j u r y  t o  t h e  MDB 
program. One cou ld  a l s o  a rgue  t h a t  a  t h r e a t  t o  t e r m i n a t e  f u t u r e  U.S. p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  w i l l  f o r c e  t h e  MDBs and t h e  o t h e r  member c o u n t r i e s  t o  t a k e  t h e  U.S. 
p o s i t i o n  s e r i o u s l y .  The v i e w  presumes t h a t ,  i f  t h e  MDBs and t h e  o t h e r  donor  
c o u n t r i e s  have t o  d e c i d e  between con t inued  U.  S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  MDB 
program and t h e  r i g h t  t o  make c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  l o a n s  ( o r  t o  expe l  Taiwan),  
t h e y  w i l l  a c q u i e s c e  t o  t h e  U.S. p o s i t i o n .  A s  a  coun te ra rgument ,  o n e  might 
say  t h a t  -- however v a l i d  U.S. c o n c e r n  about a  p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e  might b e  -- 
t h e  MDB program i s  v e r y  v a l u a b l e  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  r i s k s  from 
t h i s  proposal  o u t r u n  t h e  p o s s i b l e  g a i n s .  One could  a l s o  argue s a y  t h a t  t h e  
proposed U.S. p o s i t i o n  l a c k s  f l e x i b i l i t y  and i t  i n v i t e s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  
t u r n  t h e i r  p o l i c y  c o n c e r n s  i n t o  non-negot iable  demands. 
C .  ~ e a u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  U.S. C o n t r i b u t i o n s .  A second approach would have 
Congress adopt  l e g i s l a t i o n  which a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e s c i n d s  p a s t  a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  f o r  
U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i f  t h e  MDBs t a k e  c e r t a i n  d isapproved a c t i o n s .  In 1977,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  Senate  adopted an amendment by Sena to r  Cole which s a i d  t h a t ,  i f  
t h e  MDBs made any new l o a n s  t o  Vietnam, Cambodia, o r  Laos ,  t h e  e x i s t i n g  au thor -  
i z a t i o n s  f o r  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  them would b e  reduced ( d e a u t h o r i z e d )  by c o r -  
responding amounts. In 1987,  Senator  Symms proposed ( i n  S. 220) t h a t  t h e  
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  f o r  f u t u r e  U .  S .  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  m u l d  b e  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  reduced 
i f  t h e  MDBs made c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  l o a n s  f o r  commodities and m i n e r a l s .  Thus ,  
i n  e f f e c t ,  i f  an  MDB l e n t  $100 m i l l i o n  f o r  such purposes  and t h e  U.S. s h a r e  o f  
t h a t  M D B ' s  t o t a l  funding was 20 p e r c e n t ,  t h e  amount a u t h o r i z e d  f o r  f u t u r e  U.S. 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  would b e  reduced by $20 m i l l i o n .  I f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  reduced 
t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  when t h e  United S t a t e s  c u t  i t s  amount,  t h i s  p rocedure  
might  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reduce  t h e  amounts a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  MDBs whenever t h e y  
made an u n d e s i r a b l e  l o a n .  
An argument i n  f a v o r  of  t h i s  approach might  s t a t e  t h a t  i t  c l e a r l y  p e n a l i z e s  
t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  whenever t h e y  make l o a n s  c o n t r a r y  t o  l e g i s l a t e d  U. S. 
o b j e c t i o n s .  Over t i m e ,  o n e  cou ld  s a y ,  t h i s  approach w u l d  l i m i t  t h e  MDBs' 
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  make l o a n s  o f  t h i s  t y p e .  A coun te ra rgument  might  hold  t h a t  -- 
u n l e s s  t h e  amounts o f  money a r e  r e a l l y  q u i t e  s u b s t a n t i a l  -- t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
a g e n c i e s  w i l l  go  ahead wi th  t h e i r  l o a n  p l a n s  d e s p i t e  U.S. f i n a n c i a l  p r e s s u r e .  
Faced w i t h  a  c h o i c e  between f i n a n c e s  and p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h e  MDBs migh t  f o r e g o  . 
some income i n  o r d e r  t o  show t h e  w r l d  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  autonomous 
a g e n c i e s ,  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  a n y  s i n g l e  c o u n t r y .  
A b r o a d e r  coun te ra rgument  might hold  t h a t  such  a t t e m p t s  t o  d e a u t h o r i z e  
a r e  n o t  t i m e l y  o r  aimed a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  p l a c e .  I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  wants  
t o  r e d u c e  i t s  agreed s h a r e  i n  a n  MDB fund ing  p l a n ,  i t  shou ld  do so  a t  t h e  t ime  
t h e  MDB fund ing  p l a n  i s  a u t h o r i z e d .  The counterargument  would h o l d  t h a t ,  i f  
Congress a u t h o r i z e s  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  v o t e  f o r  an  MDB r e s o l u t i o n  
t h a t  c o n t e m p l a t e s  a c e r t a i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n  from t h e  United S t a t e s ,  t h e  amount 
which Congress a u t h o r i z e s  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  shou ld  match t h e  amount s t i p u l a t e d  
i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement .  Congress might  d e l a y  o r  s t r e t c h  o u t  i t s  con- 
t r i b u t i o n s  t o  an  MDB fund ing  p l a n ,  t h e  a d v o c a t e s  o f  t h i s  v iew would a r g u e ,  and 
t h i s  a l s o  h a s  an  e f f e c t  on t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
agency.  I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  wants t o  r educe  t h e  a c t u a l  amount i t  h a s  agreed 
t o  p r o v i d e ,  however ,  i t  canno t  m e r e l y  c u t  t h e  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  -- i t  must a l s o  seek  
a  change i n  t h e  U.S. s h a r e  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  formal Board of  Governors r e s o l u t i o n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  MDB rep len i shment  p l a n .  
D .  Earmarking A p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,  A t h i r d  approach would be  t o  s e e k  t h e  impo- 
s i t i o n  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  way t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  can use  any money 
c o n t r i b u t e d  by t h e  United S t a t e s .  During t h e  l a t e  19709, t h e r e  was s u b s t a n t i a l  
c o n f l i c t  i n  Congress about whether t o  a t t a c h  amendments t o  t h e  annual  f o r e i g n  
a i d  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  a c t  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  t h e  U.S. funds  b e  s p e n t  o r  n o t  b e  s p e n t  
i n  s p e c i f i c  ways. In 1975,  t h e  Inter-American Development Bank r e f u s e d  t o  
a c c e p t  a  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n  which c a r r i e d  an earmark s p e c i f y i n g  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
funds  had t o  be  used f o r  l o a n s  t o  c r e d i t  unions  and c o o p e r a t i v e s .  Congress 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  d e l e t e d  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  from t h e  law.  In  1977, t h e  World Bank 
made a  $60 m i l l i o n  I D A  l o a n  t o  Vietnam. While t h i s  l o a n  was under c o n s i d e r a -  
t i o n ,  t h e  House debated whether t o  adopt l e g i s l a t i o n  d i r e c t i n g  t h a t  no U.S. 
a i d  cou ld  be  used " i n d i r e c t l y "  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  Vietnam o r  s i x  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  
Af ter  t h e  World Bank l o a n  was approved ,  t h e  House vo ted  t o  a t t a c h  t h i s  p r o h i b i -  
t i o n  t o  i t s  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  a i d  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  b i l l ,  and s i m i l a r  l ang-  
uage was a l s o  approved i n  t h e  House v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  1978 and 1979 l e g i s l a t i o n .  
The Senate  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  measure b e  o m i t t e d ,  however. Af te r  s t r e n u o u s  
d i s c u s s i o n  each y e a r ,  i t  was n o t  inc luded  i n  t h e  f i n a l  a c t .  The World Bank 
p r e s i d e n t  s a i d  each  yea r  t h a t  h i s  agency would be  unable t o  a c c e p t  l e g a l l y  t h e  
funds  i f  Congrees a t t a c h e d  t h e  " i n d i r e c t "  r e s t r i c t i o n  t o  t h e  U .  S. c o n t r i b u t i o n .  
In 1979,  a f t e r  Congress had f i r m l y  deadlocked on t h e  i s s u e ,  i t  r e c e i v e d  a  l e t t e r  
from World Bank p r e s i d e n t  McNamara say ing  t h a t  h i s  agency would not  b e  ~ r o v i d i n g  
any a i d  t o  Vietnam d u r i n g  t h e  pe r iod  covered by  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  then  under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  In  1987, Sena to r  Syrnms proposed ( i n  S. 220) t h a t  l i m i t s  should  
b e  placed on t h e  k i n d s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  t h e  MDBs c o u l d  f i n a n c e  u s i n g  funds  c o n t r i -  
buted by  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
Two i s s u e s  a r i s e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s .  
F i r s t ,  c a n  donor c o u n t r i e s  r e s t r i c t  t h e  way t h e  MDBs use  t h e i r  c o n t r i b -  
u t i o n s ?  Second, i f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  a l l o c ~ e d  , w i l l  t h e y  have a  s i g n i f i c a n t  impact 
on t h e  MDBS' l e n d i n g  programs? 
There  h a s  been a m a j o r  c o n t r o v e r s y  s i n c e  a t  l e a s t  t h e  l a t e  1970s about  e a r -  
marks o n  " i n d i r e c t "  a i d .  - 5 /  The advoca tes  o f  earmarks  a rgue  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  
v a l i d  e x e r c i s e  by Congress o f  t h e  "power o f  t h e  purse . "  They m a i n t a i n  t h a t  i t  i s  
wrong f o r  t h e  banks  t o  u s e  U.S. c o n t r i b u t e d  funds  f o r  purposes  which a r e  n o t  
suppor ted  by t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e r e  needs t o  b e  some mechanism t o  p r e v e n t  
t h a t  from o c c u r r i n g .  The opponents  a r g u e  t h a t  ea rmark ing  i s  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  
MDBs' c h a r t e r s ,  t h a t  t h e  MDBs c a n n o t  l e g a l l y  a c c e p t  o r  u s e  t h e  f u n d s ,  and t h a t  
e f f o r t s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  i n v i t e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a t t a c h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  t h e i r  own 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  t h e y  s a y ,  t h e  p r a c t i c e  would undercu t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e -  
n e s s  o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s ,  and t h e  damage done t o  t h e  MDBs' programs 
m u l d  no t  b e  worth  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  migh t  b e  ga ined  from earmarking U.S. con- 
t r i b u t i o n s .  The opponents  n o t e  t h a t ,  whi le  P r e s i d e n t  McNamara's p ledge  t o  
Congress i n  1979 was made w i t h o u t  p r i o r  formal c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  Bank's 
Board of  Governors o r  i t s  Board o f  Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r s ,  t h e r e  was i n  f a c t  a  
growing consensus  i n  t h e  Bank and among t h e  donor  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  Vietnam d i d  
n o t  m e r i t  f u r t h e r  a i d  £ r a n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n .  
The o t h e r  i s s u e  i s  whether earmarking would s e r i o u s l y  change t h e  l o a n  
5 /  For a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s ,  s e e  CRS i s s u e  b r i e f  IB79114 M u l t i l a t e r a l  
 evel lo bent Banks : Can t h e  U.  S. & s t r i c t  I t s  C o n t r i b u t i o n s ?  [ a r c h i v e d ]  See 
a l s o  : Jona than  E. Sanford .  R e s t r i c t i o n s  on United S t a t e s  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  
M u l t i l a t e r a l  Development Banks. The J o u r n a l  of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law and Econ- 
omics ,  15 :3  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  For  a  d i f f e r e n t  v i e w ,  s e e :  V i c t o r i a  E. Marmors te in .  
World Bank Power t o  Consider  Human R i g h t s  F a c t o r s  i n  b a n  D e c i s i o n s .  The 
J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law and Economics, 13:l ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
programs admin i s t e red  by  t h e  M D B s .  Proponents  a rgue  t h a t ,  i f  U.S. funds  a r e  
e 
r e s t r i c t e d ,  t h e  MDBs w i l l  have l e s s  money a v a i l a b l e  t o  f i n a n c e  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  
a c t i v i t i e s .  Opponents contend t h a t ,  i f  an  MDB wants t o  make a  c e r t a i n  type  o f  
l o a n  n o t  suppor ted  by t h e  United S t a t e s  and i f  o t h e r  donor c o u n t r i e s  s u p p o r t  
t h i s  l e n d i n g ,  t h e  MDB w i l l  s imply  use  funds  c o n t r i b u t e d  by  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  
The funds d e r i v e d  from t h e  I h i t e d  S t a t e s  cou ld  be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agency ' s  l o a n  p o r t f o l i o  and t h e r e  would b e  no r e a l  change i n  t h e  
o v e r a l l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  bank'  s  o p e r a t i o n s .  
The earmarking i s s u e  i n  t h e  1970s had t o  do  wi th  t h e  way t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
a g e n c i e s  used funds  t h e  United S t a t e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e i r  c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n  
windows. The b u l k  o f  t h e  money f o r  t h e s e  l o a n s  comes d i r e c t l y  £ ran  c o n t r i b u -  
t i o n s  by  g w e r m e n t s  ( r a t h e r  t h a n  from borrowings  o r  i n v e s t m e n t s ) ,  s o  earmark- 
i n g  would have a d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on t h e  amount t h e  MDBs cou ld  l e n d .  
Th i s  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  c a s e ,  however,  w i t h  t h e  p l a n  s e t  f o r t h  i n  1987 
i n  S.220. According t o  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h e  MDBs would b e  pena l i zed  i f  they  
use  " funds  a p p r o p r i a t e d  o r  o t h e r w i s e  made a v a i l a b l e  pursuan t  t o  any p r o v i s i o n  o f  
l a d '  t o  f i n a n c e  c e r t a i n  k inds  o f  l o a n s  f o r  t h e  ~ r o d u c t i o n  o f  commodities o r  
m i n e r a l s .  The r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  use  o f  U.S. c o n t r i b u t e d  funds d o  n o t  seem t o  
a f f e c t  any  l o a n s  f inanced  w i t h  money c o n t r i b u t e d  b y  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o r  o b t a i n e d  
through borrowing o r  income from t h e  MDBs' inves tment  p o r t f o l i o s .  The MDBs g e t  
most of t h e  money f o r  t h e i r  o r d i n a r y  c a p i t a l  (non-concess iona l )  l o a n s  from 
borrowing o r  inves tment  income. L i t t l e  i s  f inanced  wi th  d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by  
governments.  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  proposed r e s t r i c t i o n  i n  S. 2 2 0  
m u l d  have any d i r e c t  impact on t h e  loan  program f inanced  through t h e  MDBS' 
r e g u l a r  non-concess ional  l o a n  window, Most o f  t h e  canmodi ty  o r  m i n e r a l  l o a n s  
which prompted t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a r e  f inanced i n  t h i s  manner.  
E, c u t  A p p r o p r i a t i o n  L e v e l s  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y .  This i s  a  v a r i a n t  on t h e  
concep t  of  r e d u c i n g  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  l e v e l s .  It w u l d  no t  s e e k  t o  change t h e  
amount t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  agreed t o  p r o v i d e ,  b u t  i t  would r e d u c e  t h e  amount 
a c t u a l l y  provided i n  o r d e r  t o  c a l l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  c o n c e r n .  The   rime 
example o f  t h i s  was t h e  1979 c u t  i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  I D A  4. That y e a r ,  a f t e r  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  p r o h i b i t i o n s  o n  " i n d i r e c t "  U.  S. a i d  were s e t t l e d ,  Congress 
vo ted  t o  p e n a l i z e  t h e  World Bank f o r  having made t h e  1977 l o a n  b y  c u t t i n g  t h e  
f i n a l  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  I D A  by $20 m i l l i o n .  ( T h i s  was t h e  presumed U.S. 
s h a r e  o f  t h e  Vietnam l o a n ,  c a l c u l a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l o a n  
was f inanced  wi th  funds  from t h e  I D A  f o u r t h  r e p l e n i s h m e n t  and t h e  United S t a t e s  
was scheduled t o  p rov ide  o n e - t h i r d  of  t h e  funds  f o r  I D A  4.)  I n  1981,  t h e  
p o i n t  hav ing  been  made, Congress a p p r o p r i a t e d  t h e  f i n a l  $20 m i l l i o n  due f o r  
t h e  I D A  4 r e p l e n i s h m e n t .  
F .  Block Disbursement .  Congress h a s  adopted s e v e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  which 
p reven t  t h e  Treasury  from c o n t r i b u t i n g  p r e v i o u s l y - a p p r o p r i a t e d  f u n d s  t o  t h e  
MDBs i f  t h e y  f a i l  t o  t a k e  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i e d  s t e p s .  For example ,  t h e  annua l  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  a c t s  s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  none o f  t h e  funds  p r w i d e d  b y  t h e  a c t  may 
b e  made a v a i l a b l e  t o  any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agency where t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
c a n n o t  o b t a i n  (upon r e q u e s t )  a n y  document prepared b y  t h e  management o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agency o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  amounts t h e  agency h a s  l e n t  t o  each  
o f  i t s  borrowlers. L i k e v i s e ,  no f u n d s  may b e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  any MDB which pays 
t h e i r  U.S. e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  more t h a n  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i e d  amounts.  The 
United S t a t e e  makes i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n e  t o  t h e  banks  i n  t h e  form o f  non-revocable  
l e t t e r s  of  c r e d i t ,  a g a i n s t  which t h e  MDRs may draw a s  t h e y  r e q u i r e  t h e  f u n d s .  
The Treasury  Department i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  above l e g i s l a t i v e  i n j  u n c t i o n s  a s  a f f e c t -  
ing  whether t h e  l e t t e r s  o f  c r e d i t  may b e  p r o v i d e d ,  n o t  whether t h e y  may b e  
honored when t h e  t ime a c t u a l l y  comes t o  pay o u t  t h e  money. 
The p roponen t s  of  t h i s  approach m a i n t a i n  t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  MDB program b u t  i t  does  p rov ide  g u a r a n t e e s  
about t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  program. They s a y  t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  a r i g h t  t o  
i n s i s t  on c e r t a i n  minimum s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t h e  programs t o  which i t  provides  i t s  
funds .  The opponents  would argue t h a t ,  i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  wants c e r t a i n  s t a n -  
d a r d s  f o r  t h e  MDB program, i t  should  a s k  t h e  banks '  3oards  of  Governor t o  adopt 
them r a t h e r  than  seek ing  t o  impose them u n i l a t e r a l l y  th rough  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  
p r o c e s s .  In any  c a s e ,  t h e y  would o b s e r v e ,  once t h e  MDBs have r e c e i v e d  money 
from t h e  United S t a t e s ,  none o f  t h e  s a n c t i o n s  under t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  a c t  would 
prevent  them from t a k i n g  t h e  d i sapproved  s t e p  i f  t h e y  d e s i r e d .  
G. R e c a l l  P r e v i o u s  C o n t r i b u t i o n s .  In 1977, t h e  House r e j e c t e d  a  p roposa l  
by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Cla rence  M i l l e r  t h a t  would have r e q u i r e d  t h e  MDBs t o  r e t u r n  
t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  ( f rom i t s  p a s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s )  i t s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  s h a r e  o f  
any  l o a n s  t h e y  made t o  Cuba o r  t h e  Indochinese  c o u n t r i e s .  The proponents  
argued t h a t  t h i s  was an  a p p r o p r i a t e  way t o  p e n a l i z e  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a g e n c i e s  
i f  t h e y  took s t e p s  t h e  United S t a t e s  d i sapproved .  The opponents  s a i d  t h a t ,  
once t h e  U.S. money was f o r m a l l y  c o n t r i b u t e d ,  t h e r e  was no way under t h e  
MDBs '  c h a r t e r s  ( s h o r t  of  withdrawal from membership) t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  
cou ld  g e t  any o f  i t  back.  They argued t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  l o a n  programs f inanced  
on a  j o i n t  b a s i s ,  n o t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  where e v e r y  c o u n t r y  h a s  a  s e p a r a t e  a c c o u n t .  
They a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  ~ r a c t i c a l  problems wi th  t h i s  approach .  The MDBs 
may have a l r e a d y  s i g n e d  b i n d i n g  l o a n  agreements commit t ing t h e  funds  f o r  use  
i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  Moreover,  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  have made t h e i r  own 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by that  p o i n t ,  and -- under t h e  l e g a l  terms o f  t h e  MDB funding 
r e s o l u t i o n s  -- t h e i r  governments might have t o  a s k  t h e  MDBs t o  r e t u r n  a  
comparable p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  succeeded i n  
withdrawing some o f  i t s  f u n d s .  In any c a s e ,  t h e  opponents  s a y ,  a  s t e p  l i k e  
t h i s  would b e  a  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  b a s i c  m u l t i l a t e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  program. 
111. EFFECTIVENESS 
How e f f e c t i v e  have these  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e s  been i n  i n f luenc ing  U.S. 
po l icy  and MDB ope ra t ions?  In some c a s e s ,  t h e  laws seem t o  have been adopted 
mainly t o  inf luence  U.S. Government pol icy  -- encouraging coord ina t ion  between 
U.S. po l icy  i n  t he  MDBs and U.S. b i l a t e r a l  a i d  po l i cy ,  for  example. In o the r  
c a s e s ,  t h e  laws seem t o  have been adopted with the  expec ta t ion  t h a t  t he  U.S. 
s t ance  would have an e f f e c t  on f u t u r e  MDB ope ra t ions .  
In assess ing  the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of these  v a r i o u s  laws ,  one needs t o  s epa ra t e  
the  a c t s  which s e t  po l i cy  o r  r e q u i r e s  t he  U.S. vo te  t o  be  c a s t  i n  c e r t a i n  way 
from t h e  e f f o r t s  which seek t o  use the  power of t h e  purse .  
Laws Con t ro l l i ng  the  U .S . Vote 
In g e n e r a l ,  t h e  requirements  t h a t  the  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t he  banks 
must v o t e  i n  s p e c i f i c  ways have had a  t h e i r  c l e a r e s t  impact on MDB ope ra t ions  
i n  those c a s e s  where the  i n t e n t  of t he  U.S. law p a r a l l e l s  t h e  underlying g o a l s  
of  t h e  MDB program. One such in s t ance  was t h e  law t h a t  d i r e c t e d  t h e  U.S. 
r e p r e s e n a t i v e s  a t  the  banks t o  seek the  adoption of procedures  f o r  post-hoc 
reviews of the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  completed MDB p r o j e c t s .  Many a n a l y s t s  would 
argue t h a t  o the r  i n s t ances  may b e  the  laws t h a t  r e q u i r e  the U.S. r ep re sen t -  
a t i v e s  a t  t h e  banks t o  use t h e i r  in f luence  t o  encourage more MDB a t t e n t i o n  t o  
environmental i s s u e s ,  promote the reduct ion  of  t r ade  b a r r i e r s ,  t o  encourage 
more lending  for  renewable energy ,  and d iscourage  lending t o  c o u n t r i e s  which 
expropr i a t e  fore ign  i n v e s t o r s  without compensation. 
Less success  has been achieved by t h e  d i r e c t i v e s  which r e q u i r e  the  U.S. 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  press  f o r  goa l s  which a r e  only  p a r t l y  compatible  with the  
goa l s  of t h e  MDB program. The m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks,  for  example, seek t o  promote 
t h r e e  g o a l s  -- economic g rowth ,  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  and pover ty  a l l e v i a t i o n  -- 
which a r e  n o t  i n c m p a t i v e  b u t  can have c o n f l i c t i n g  requ i rements  i n  some s i  tua- 
t i o n s .  The laws which r e q u i r e  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  banks t o  put  
s p e c i a l  emphasis on l e n d i n g  f o r  pover ty  a l l e v i a t i o n  o r  l o r  b a s i c  human needs 
have helped r e i n f o r c e  t h e  banks '  t e n d e n c i e s  i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  To t h e  e x t e n t  
t h i s  emphasis d e t r a c t s  from t h e  g o a l s  o f  promoting growth and s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,  
however,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  l i m i t s  on i t s  s u c c e s s  i n  changing MDB p r i o r i t i e s .  
The l e a s t  s u c c e e s s  h a s  been had by t h e  laws t h a t  r e q u i r e  t h e  r e p r e p r e s e n -  
t a t i v e s  t o  pursue  g o a l s  which a r e  i n c m p a t i b l e  wi th  t h e  MDB program's b a s i c  
p r i n c i p l e s .  The d i r e c t i v e s  which r e q u i r e  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  oppose l e n d i n g  
t o  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  engage i n  d rug  t r a f f i c k i n g ,  v i o l a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  recog- 
n ized  human r i g h t s ,  o r  purchase  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m i l i t a r y  equipment have n o t  had 
much demons t rab le  e f f e c t  on MDB l o a n  p a t t e r n s .  Most MDB member c o u n t r i e s  
c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  i s s u e s ,  s e r i o u s  though t h e y  may b e ,  t o  b e  p o l i t i c a l  o r  i n t e r n a l  
q u e s t i o n s .  Thus, t h e y  a r g u e ,  t h e  banks  must g i v e  due heed t o  p r o v i s i o n s  of  
t h e i r  a r t i c l e s  o f  agreement which p r o h i b i t  them from i n t e r f e r i n g  i n  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e i r  member c o u n t r i e s  o r  from us ing  any th ing  o t h e r  t h a n  
economic c r i t e r i a  i n  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s .  By v o t i n g  t o  oppose MDB 
l o a n s  i n  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  s i g n a l e d  i t s  concern .  The 
I I v o i c e  and vote"  of  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  succeeded,  however,  i n  
a l t e r i n g  t h e  MDBs' b a s i c  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  i n t e r f e r e  i n  what t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t o  b e  
i n t e r n a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o v e r s i e s .  
E f f o r t s  t o  Use t h e  "Power o f  t h e  Purse" 
Many peop le  a r e  concerned t h a t  t h e  requ i rements  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  c a s t  
i t s  v o t e s  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  deve lopnen t  banks i n  c e r t a i n  ways i s  evidence of  
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n ,  a  weakening of  t h e  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  economic c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  MDB 
program. Most acknowledge,  however,  t h a t  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  t h e  same r i g h t s  
a l l  o t h e r  members have t o  v o i c e  i t s  c o n c e r n s  and t o  use  i t s  v o t e  t o  s e e k  t o  
i n f l u e n c e  MDB o p e r a t i o n s .  More c o n t r o v e r s y  s u r r o u n d s  a t t e m p t s  t o  u s e  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  p r o c e s s  a s  a  means f o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  MDB o p e r a t i o n s .  Many b e l i e v e  
t h i s  a c t i o n  s t r i k e s  much more d i r e c t l y  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  of  t h e  
MDB program. It i s  one t h i n g ,  t h e y  f e e l ,  f o r  a  c o u n t r y  t o  c a s t  i t s  v o t e  a g a i n s t  
a  l o a n .  It i s  a n o t h e r  f o r  t h i n g  f o r  a  c o u n t r y  t o  r e f u s e  t o  j o i n  wi th  t h e  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  t h e  m a j o r i t y  h a s  agreed  t o  s u p p o r t  
o r  f o r  i t  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  u s e  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  power t o  t w i s t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s  
and f o r c e  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  t a k e  s t e p s  t h e  m a j o r i t y  w u l d  no t  s u p p o r t .  
Th i s  c o n t r o v e r y  a s i d e ,  t h e  r e c o r d  shows t h a t  some o f  t h e  a t t e m p t s  t o  use  
t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p r o c e s s  i n  t h i s  way have been  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  e n a c t  i n t o  
l aw t h a n  o t h e r s .  The h a r d e s t  fought  i s s u e  i s  p robab ly  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  ea rmarks  
on t h e  " i n d i r e c t "  use  o f  U.S. c o n t r i b u t e d  f u n d s .  It t e n d s  t o  become a  t e c h n i c a l  
l e g a l  d i s p u t e  about whether t h e  MDBs c a n  a c c e p t  o r  use  earmarked f u n d s ,  n o t  a  
d e b a t e  whether t h e y  shou ld  make c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  l o a n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
t h e r e  seems t o  have been o n l y  l i m i t e d  r e s i s t a n c e  i n  Congress t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  
o f  p r o p o s a l s  b a r r i n g  t h e  d i sbursement  o f  funds  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n c i e s  t h a t  
behave i n  c e r t a i n  ways o r  f a i l  t o  t a k e  c e r t a i n  s t e p s .  The laws t h a t  employ 
t h i s  t e c h n i q u e  have been f a i r l y  na r row i n  f o c u s ,  however,  b e i n g  m a i n l y  s t i p u -  
l a t i o n s  a s s e r t i n g  ( o r  waiving)  r i g h t s  t h e  k i t e d  S t a t e s  presumably h a s  a l r e a d y  
a s  a  r e s u l t  of  i t s  MDB membership. 
None o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  us ing  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p r o c e s s  d i s c u s s e d  above 
above h a s  been  v e r y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  s t o p p i n g  t h e  MDBs f r m  making l o a n s  which t h e i r  
c r i t i c s  oppose .  Even i f  U.S. l e g i s l a t i o n  were t o  succeed i n  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  way' 
t h e  banks  c a n  use  U.S.-contributed f u n d s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e y  would s t i l l  b e  
a b l e  make a s p e c i f i c  l o a n  ( i f  t h e  o t h e r  member c o u n t r i e s  a g r e e )  us ing  money from 
o t h e r  donors  o r  from o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  The c o n t r o v e r s y  about p r o h i b i t i o n s  on 
" i n d i r e c t "  a s s i s t a n c e  helped s t o p  t h e  World Bank from making more l o a n s  t o  
Vietnam, b u t  one  cou ld  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  change a l s o  occur red  because  t h e  Bank 
found t h a t  t h i s  l e n d i n g  was no l o n g e r  a p p r o p r i a t e  and t h e  o t h e r  ma jor  donor  
c o u n t r i e s  ag reed .  Some have proposed t h a t  f u t u r e  l e v e l s  of U.  S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
should  d e c l i n e  i f  t h e  MDBs make c e r t a i n  k inds  o f  l o a n s .  The c h o i c e  o f  whether 
t o  r i s k  t h e  reduced c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o r  t o  make t h e  l o a n  remains with t h e  bank ,  
however. The United S t a t e s  canno t  s t o p  t h e  MDBs from doing what t h e y  w i l l .  
The fundmental  assumpt ion under ly ing  U.S p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
development banks h o l d s  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n c i e s  which have been 
c r e a t e d  b y  governments t o  a c c m p l i s h  c e r t a i n  g o a l s  us ing  s p e c i f i e d  p rocedures .  
Except through t h e i r  v o t e s  c a s t  on t h e  MDBs'  e x e c u t i v e  b o a r d s ,  t h o s e  r u l e s  
o f f e r  member governments no u n i l a t e r a l  methods f o r  s t o p p i n g  t h e  MDBs from 
making c e r t a i n  l o a n s .  If  one a c c e p t s  t h i s  a s sumpt ion ,  t h e  b a s i c  i s s u e  i s  
whether and how t h e  United S t a t e s  can  use  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p rocess  a s  a  way o f  
pursuading o t h e r  governments t h a t  change i s  needed i n  MDB p o l i c y  o r  o p e r a t i o n s .  
Over t h e  y e a r s ,  Congress h a s  adopted a  number o f  laws which r e q u i r e  t h a t  
t h e  " v o i c e  and vote"  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  s h a l l  be  used i n  s p e c i f i c  ways t o  up- 
hold  c e r t a i n  p o l i c y  p o s i t i o n s .  O v e r a l l ,  however, t h e  p s i t i o n  which t h e  United 
S t a t e s  t a k e s  d u r i n g  formal MDB Board d e l i b e r a t i o n s  i s  no t  d e c i s i v e .  Except i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  c o n c e s s i o n a l  l o a n s  from t h e  Inter-American Development Bank, t h e  
United S t a t e s  l a c k s  a  s u f f i c i e n t  v o t e  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  b l o c k  l o a n s  
on i t s  own. It needs  t h e  v o t e s  o f  o t h e r  member c o u n t r i e s  t o  g a r n e r  a s u f f i c i e n t  
m a j o r i t y  t o  s t o p  l o a n s  which i t  d i s a p p r o v e s .  
The q u e s t i o n  i s  how t h e  United S t a t e s  can  e f f e c t i v e l y  persuade o t h e r  coun- 
t r i e s  t o  s u p p o r t  i t s  p o s i t i o n  when d i s c u s s i o n s  a r e  he ld  and v o t e s  a r e  t aken  i n  
t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks .  The c a l c u l u s  f o r  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n  on c o n t r i b u t i o n  
l e v e l s  i s  no d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  t h e  c a l c u l u s  f o r  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n  r e q u i r i n g  
t h a t  t h e  U.S. v o t e  b e  c a s t  in s p e c i f i c  ways. 
The h i s t o r i c a l  r e c o r d  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  a t  t a c h  e a r -  
marks b a r r i n g  c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  " i n d i r e c t "  a i d  have r e c e i v e d  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  
t h e  banks  and o t h e r  member c o u n t r i e s ,  b u t  t h e y  have no t  been  a s  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  
g e t t i n g  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  o r  v o t e .  S t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  f u t u r e  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
t h e  MDB program cou ld  b e  put  a t  r i s k  i f  c e r t a i n  s t e p s  were t a k e n  ( e  .g., t h e  
e x p u l s i o n  o f  Taiwan from t h e  ADB) were a r g u a b l y  more s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a c q u i r i n g  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s '  s u p p o r t .  b r e o v e r ,  u n l i k e  some o f  t h e  more r e c e n t  arguments  
about t h e  MDBs making l o a n s  f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  goods i n  s e n s i t i v e  economic 
s e c t o r s ,  t h e  argument t h a t  a n  e x i s t i n g  member c o u n t r y  (Taiwan) shou ld  b e  a l l o w d  
t o  c o n t i n u e  i t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  bank was a p p a r e n t l y  s e e n  a s  more c o m p a t i b l e  
wi th  t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  MDB program. 
There  seems t o  b e  a  common assumpt ion under ly ing  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  advoca ted  
f o r  b o t h  t h e  Taiwan e x p u l s i o n  and t h e  loan-for-the-production-of-commodi t i e s -  
o r - m i n e r a l s  i s s u e s .  Both seem t o  ho ld  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n s i s t s  on 
i t s  way and t h r e a t e n s  t h e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  t h e  MDB program, i t  w i l l  b e  s u c c e s s f u l .  
Th i s  may have worked i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  ADB and Taiwan, f o r  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  
T a i w a d C h i n a  i s s u e  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  g i v e s  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n  more 
t h a n  s u r f a c e  c r e d i b i l i t y .  Whether t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  accord t h e  same 
c r e d i b i l i t y  t o  U.S. p o e i t i o n s  which seem t o  b e  based  more on arguments  about  
economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i n  s p e c i f i c  s e c t o r s  o r  i n d u s t r i e s  i s  a n o t h e r  m a t t e r .  
I n  t h e  e n d ,  i t  may b e  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  argument t h e  United S t a t e s  makes,  
no t  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  i t  u s e s ,  which may b e  d e c i s i v e  i n  g e t t i n g  t h e  MDBs t o  change 
t h e i r  l e n d i n g  p a t t e r n s  i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  is a b l e  
t o  pe r suade  enough o f  t h e  o t h e r  advanced i n d u s t r i a l  ( d o n o r )  c o u n t r i e s  about  
t h e  e f f i c a c y  o f  i t s  v i e w ,  t h e n  t h e  United S t a t e s  w i l l  p robab ly  succeed  i n  
i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  MDB l o a n  program. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i f  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
of  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  a t  t h e  MDBs d o  not  s u p p o r t  t h e  U.S. p o s i t i o n ,  however,  i t  
may b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  g e t  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e i r  h i g h e r  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
An i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o v e r s y  caused by some u n i l a t e r a l  U.S. e f f o r t  t o  use  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  p rocess  t o  i n f l u e n c e  MDB o p e r a t i o n s  may b e  one way t o  g e t  t h a n  
i n v o l v e d .  
I f  t h e  U.S. argument i s  one  t h a t  can win on i t s  m e r i t s  o r  through high-  
l e v e l  b a r g a i n i n g  b e t w e n  t h e  United S t a t e s  and i t s  a l l i e s ,  then  e s c a l a t i n g  t h e  
i s s u e  through i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p rocess  may b e  an a p p r o p r i a t e  
s t r a t e g y .  
I f  t h e  U.S. arguments a r e  n o t  p u r s u a s i v e  o r  t h e  U.S. l a c k s  b a r g a i n i n g  
" c l o u t  ," however, t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  p r o c e s s  may n o t  b e  an  e f f e c t i v e  p l a c e  
f o r  p o l i c y  a d v o c a t e s  i n  t h e  U.S. sys tem t o  s e e k  t o  make t h e i r  p o i n t s .  They 
may a l s o  wish t o  c o n s i d e r  whether t h e  p o s s i b l e  g a i n  from seek ing  r e s o l u t i o n  
o f  t h e  i s s u e  which prompts t h e i r  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  a r e  g r e a t  enough t o  outweigh 
t h e  p o s s i b l e  l o s s e s  which may r e s u l t  i f  t h e  s t r u g g l e  damages t h e  MDB program's 
under ly ing  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
I n  such s i t u a t i o n s ,  p o l i c y  a d v o c a t e s  might want t o  c o n s i d e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  
means o f  g i v i n g  e x p r e s s i o n  t o  t h e i r  c o n c e r n s .  The most e f f e c t i v e  of  t h e s e  
might b e  l e g i s l a t i o n  d i r e c t i n g  t h a t  t h e  U.S. " v o i c e  and vote"  i n  t h e  MDBs b e  
used t o  advoca te  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  concern  i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  
There a r e  drawbacks t o  t h i s  approach .  Most n o t a b l y ,  i t  cannot  promise s u c c e s s  
i n  changing MDB p o l i c y  i n  t h e  immediate f u t u r e .  It d o e s  o f f e r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  
however,  f o r  keeping t h e  i s s u e  a l i v e .  (her t i m e ,  i t  a l s o  p r o v i d e s  o c c a s i o n s  
fo r  pe r suad ing  o t h e r  member c o u n t r y  governments about t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  U.S. 
concern .  
APPENDIX 1 .  
LEGISLATION GOVERNING U.S. POLICY 
I N  THE MULTILATERAL BANKS 
Genera l  D e v e l o m e n t  P o l i c v  
1 .  Bas ic  Human Needs. U.S. p o l i c y  i n  bo th  b i l a t e r a l  and m u l t i l a t e r a l  
a i d  i s  t o  emphasize s u p p o r t  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  pursu ing  development s t r a t e g i e s  
des igned  t o  meet b a s i c  human needs arid s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  growth wi th  e q u i t y .  
U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks i s  t o  p l a c e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
emphasis on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  development a i d  shou ld  h e l p  t h e  poor 
m a j z r i t y  i n  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r i e s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  e q u i t a b l e  growth and a l s o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n c r e a s i n g i y  i n  " e c i a i o n s  which a f f e c t  t h e i r  l i v e s .  [IDPA 
Act of  1978,  amending t h e  Fore ign  A s s i s t a n c e  Act of  1961,  s e c .  1021 
2 +  - B r ~ l e s  -..- of  B i l a t e r a l  and M u l t i l a t e r a l  Aid .  U.S. f o r e i g n  a i d  a c t i v -  
i t i e s  which i n v o l v e  l a r g e - s c a l e  c a p i t a l  t r a n s f e r s  shou ld  b e  c a r r i e r !  o u t  
th rough  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  e f f o r t s  b y  
oLher d o n o r s ,  and U.S. b i l a t e r a l  a i d  programs shou ld  c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
p r o j e c t s  which d o  nor i n v o l v e  l a r g e s c a l e  c a p i t a l  t r a n s f e r s .  [IDFA Act 
of  1978,  m e n d i n g  t h e  FA Act o f  1961,  se2. 1 0 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) ]  
3 .  4 r i c u l t u r e .  Hunger and E x p o r t s .  U.S. p o l i c y  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
banks sha71 seek t o  combat hunger  a n d  m a l n u t r i t i o n  b y  emphasiz ing 
expanded a i d  fo r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a t t e c p t  t o  improvs t h e i r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  an3 ti y  e f f o r t s  t o  ctiilnncl rnu'lt i l a t e r a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a i d  funds  
towards  p r o j ~ _ c t s  des igned  t o  a l l e v i z t e  hunger and f u l f i l l  t h e  borrower  
c o u ~ k t r y ' s  dorueatic food needs and away from p r o j e c t s  des igned  t o  produce 
c e r ~ a i n  a g r i c ~ n l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  f o r  e x p o r t .  [ I F 1  Act o f  1977,  s e c .  9 0 1 ( a ) ]  
4 .  Country Econouiic P o l i c i e s .  The S e c r e t a r i e s  of  S t a t e  and T r e a s u r y  
s h a l l  submit  a r e p o r t  t o  t h e  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Committees,  b y  February  
1986 and February  1987, d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  d m e a t i c  economic p o l i c i e s  o f  
a l l  c o u n t r i e s  r e c e i v i n g  d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t  a i d  from t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  a i d  programs where a p p r o p r i a t e .  
[FY 1987 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u t i o n ,  a e c .  534;  FY 1986 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u t i o n ,  s e c .  535 . I  
5. Environmental  C o n s i d e r a t  i o n s .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U . S .  r e p r e s e n t a t i v a s  a t  t h e  MDBs t o  promote changes  
i n  Bank o p e r a t i n g  p o l i c y ,  s t a f f i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ,  and p r i o r i t i e s  s o  t o  
g i v e  environment a1  cons  i d e r a t  iona  h i g h e r  p r i o r i t y .  Among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  
t h e  MDBs a r e  t o  b e  urged t o  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  moni to r  t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  
programs and t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of t h e i r  f u t u r e  l e n d i n g  which 
s u p p o r t s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  p r o j e c t s .  The S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  
S t a t e  and T r e a s u r y  a r e  t o  under take  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  g o v e r m e n t s  
( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  n e x t  page) 
and t o  propose formal a c t i o n  by  t h e  govern ing  boards  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
MDBs. The T r e a s u r y  S e c r e t a r y  i s  t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Appropr ia t ions  
Committees each J a n u a r y  on p r o g r e s s  made. The Admin i s t ra to r  of 
t h e  Agency f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development i s  t o  d i r e c t  U.S. f o r e i g n  
p o s t s  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  environmental  a s p e c t s  of  MDB p r o j e c t s  i n  t h e i r  
c o u n t r i e s  of  a s s ignment .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  i s  t o  d i r e c t  
t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  MDBs t o  s e e k  changes i n  any p r o j e c t s  
which have an adverse  impact on t h e  environment .  [ F Y  1987 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  
c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u t i o n ,  s e c  . 539; 1986 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u -  
t i o n ,  s e c .  540.1 
6 .  Fore ign  Investment  i n  Development. The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  
Treasury  s h a l l  conduct  a  s t u d y  of ways t h e  MDBs could  more a c t i v e l y  
encourage f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  inves tment  and c a p i t a l  flows t o  deve lop ing  
c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b l e  c r e a t i o n  o f  new investment  banking 
f a c i l i t i e s  i n  one o r  more of t h e  MDBs. The S e c r e t a r y  s h a l l  r e p o r t  t o  
Congress by mid-1985. ( B e r e u t e r  amendment) [Supplemental  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  
Ac t ,  FY 1984, s e c .  1005.1 
Energy P o l i c y  
1 .  I D B  I n s u r a n c e  Program. The P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  e v a l u a t e ,  and r e p o r t  
by S e p t .  3 0 ,  1980,  an ID8 proposal  f o r  j o i n t  a c t i o n  t o  i n c r e a s e  e n e r g y  
and m i n e r a l s  e x p l o r a t i o n  through I D B  inves tment  i n s u r a n c e .  [ I F I  Act o f  
1980,  T i t l e  I, s e c .  1021 
2 .  Renewable Energy Resources .  The U.S. Governor a t  t h e  m u l t i -  
l a t e r a l  banks s h a l l  use  t h e  U.S. v o i c e  and v o t e  t o  encourage more a i d  
f o r  t h e  development of  renewable  energy  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  deve lop ing  
c o u n t r i e s .  In c o n j u n c t  i o n  wi th  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  s t r e s s  on environmental  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.  S .  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  MDBs t o  urge t h e  Banks t o  p u t  more emphasis on 
programs which encourage t h e  more e f f i c i e n t  use  o f  ene rgy  and o t h e r  
r e s o u r c e s  b y  borrower c o u n t r i e s .  The U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  a l s o  t o  
promote use  of  ene rgy  s o u r c e s  such a s  s o l a r ,  wind,  and biomas a s  we l l  
a s  t o  encourage more a t t e n t i o n  t o  more e f f i c i e n t  use  of e x i s t i n g  o u t p u t .  
[IFI Act o f  1980,  T i t l e  VI] [ F Y  1987 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u -  
t i o n ,  s e c .  539 ( a ) ( 6 )  . I  
Human R i g h t s  
1 .  Oppos i t ion  t o  MDB Loans .  The United S t a t e s  s h a l l  use  i t s  v o i c e  
and v o t e  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  seek  t o  channel  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  
c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  than  t h o s e  whose governments engage i n  a  c o n s i s t e n t  
p a t t e r n  o f  g r o s s  v i o l a t i o n s  of  human r i g h t s  o r  provide  r e f u g e  t o  i n d i -  
v i d u a l s  committ ing a c t s  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i r c r a f t  h i j a c k i n g .  The U .  S. 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  banks a r e  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  oppose l o a n s  t o  t h o s e  
c o u n t r i e s  u n l e s s  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  i s  d i r e c t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  programs 
which s e r v e  t h e  b a s i c  human needs of t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  c i t i z e n s  (Harkin  
amendment). [IF1 Act o f  1977,  s e c .  701(a)  and ( e l ]  
( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  next  page) 
2 .  Required Repor t s  and C o n s u l t a t i o n s .  The S e c r e t a r y  of  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
s h a l l  r e p o r t  q u a r t e r l y  o n  MDB l o a n s  and U.S.  a c t i o n s  t a k e n  r e s p e c t i n g  
human r i g h t s  a s p e c t s  of  t h e s e  l o a n s .  The S e c r e t a r y  of t h e  T r e a s u r y  s h a l l  
a l s o  c o n s u l t  f r e q u e n t 1  y w i t h  t h e  chai rmen and r a n k i n g  m i n o r i t y  members 
of  t h e  House and Sena te  a u t h o r i z i n g  commit t e e s  about p r o s p e c t i v e  p o l i c y  
changes  e f f e c t i n g  t r e a t m e n t  o f  s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r i e s .  [ I F 1  Act o f  1980, 
T i t l e  V ,  s e c .  5011 
3 .  Amendments t o  t h e  Above. The word " c o n s i s t e n t "  was removed from 
t h e  law. The Treasury  S e c r e t a r y  was d i r e c t e d  t o  f i l e  h i s  r e q u i r e d  r e p o r t s  
w i t h i n  30 days  of  t h e  end of  t h e  c a l e n d a r  q u a r t e r .  [Supplementa l  Approp- 
r i a t i o n s  Act of 1984,  s e c .  1004,  amending s e c .  701 of  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  Act of  1977. ] 
4 .  P a r a l l e l  Treatment  wi th  B i l a t e r a l  Aid .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treas-  
ury  s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  U .  S. Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  
c o n s i d e r ,  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e i r  d u t i e s ,  " s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n s  by  e i t h e r  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  b ranch  o r  t h e  Congress a s  a  whole on i n d i v i d u a l  b i l a t e r a l  a s s i s t -  
ance  programs b e c a u s e  o f  human r i g h t s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . "  [ I F 1  Act o f  1977,  
s e c .  7 0 1 ( b ) ( l ) ]  
5. Seek an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t a n d a r d .  The S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  S t a t e  and 
Treasury  s h a l l  c o n s u l t  widely  wi th  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  d e v e l o p  a  v i a b l e  
s t a n d a r d  f o r  meet ing b a s i c  human needs  and p r o t e c t i n g  human r i g h t s  and a  
mechanism f o r  i n s u r i n g  t h a t  t h e  rewards  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic coop- 
e r a t i o n  g o  t o  c o u n t r i e s  which s u b s c r i b e  t o  such s t a n d a r d s .  The P r e s i d e n t  
s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks  t o  
propose  and s e e k  a d o p t i o n  o f  amendments t o  t h e  banks '  A r t i c l e s  o f  Agree- 
ment e s t a b l i s h i n g  human r i g h t s  s t a n d a r d s  t o  be  used i n  c o n n e c t i o n  wi th  
t h e i r  a s s i s t a n c e  programs (Young amendment). The P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  
i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. Governor of t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks  t o  c o n s u l t  wi th  
o t h e r  governors  about  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  c h a r t e r  amendments e s t a b l i s h i n g  
human r i g h t s  s t a n d a r d s  t o  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n c e .  [ I F 1  Act 
o f  1977, s e c .  703. Fore ign  A s s i s t a n c e  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Act o f  1979,  s e c .  
611,  IF1 Act of 1980,  T i t l e  V ,  s e c .  7051 
Bas ic  Human Needs 
1 .  Encourage Lendinq.  The m i z e d  S t a t e s  i s  t o  u s e  i t s  v o i c e  and 
v o t e  i n  t h e  banks t o  s e e k  t o  channe l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  p r o j e c t s  which 
a d d r e s s  t h e  b a s i c  h m a n  needs  o f  t h e  peop le  i n  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r y .  
The S e c r e t a r y  of  t h e  Treasury  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  i n s t r u c t  U.S. Execu t ive  
D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  c o n s i d e r ,  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e i r  
d u t i e s ,  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  banits '  economic a s s i s t a n c e  d i r e c t l y  
b e n e f i t s  t h e  needy peop le  i n  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r y .  [ I F I  Act o f  1977, 
s e c .  7 0 1 ( d ) ]  [ I F 1  Act o f  1977,  s e c .  7 0 1 ( b ) ( s ) ]  
2 .  Seek an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t a n d a r d .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
s h a l l  c o n s u l t  wi th  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  about  t h e  adop t ion  o f  g u i d e l i n e s  i n  
a l l  t h e  banks s p e c i f y i n g  t h a t  some s p e c i f i c  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  
t h e i r  l e n d i n g  shou ld  b e  t a r g e t e d  toward h e l p i n g  t h e  poores t  peop le  i n  t h e  
borrower  c o u n t r i e s .  [ I 9 8 1  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  A c t ,  add ing  s e c .  1101 t o  t h e  
IF1 Act of 19771 ( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  n e x t  page) 
Lending t o  S p e c i f i c  Nat ions  
1 .  Loans t o  nonmembers .  No funds a u t h o r i z e d  f o r  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t o  t h e  I D B  may be  used f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  non-member c o u n t r i e s .  (Cuba 
i s  no t  a  membkr o f  t h e  IDB.) [ IF I  Act o f  1980, T i t l e  I ,  s e c .  2 9 ( d ) ]  
2 .  Taiwan membership i n  ADB. I t  i s  t h e  sense  of t h e  Congress t h a t  
Taiwan s h a l l  be al lowed t o  r e t a i n  membership i n  t h e  ADB, and a  s e r i o u s  
r e v i e w  of U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and membership w i l l  ensue should  Taiwan 
b e  e x p e l l e d  from t h e  ADB. It i s  t h e  Sense o f  Congress t h a t  Taiwan 
should  remain a  member of  t h e  Asian Development Bank and i t s  s t a t u s  i n  
t h a t  body should  remain u n a l t e r e d  no m a t t e r  what a c t i o n  i s  t aken  on t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  
S e c r e t a r i e s  
S t a t e s  w i l l  
[ I F 1  Act of  
1984, s e c .  
of  t h e  Peop les '  Republic of  China f o r  membership. The 
o f  S t a t e  and Treasury  should  make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  United 
not  countenance a t t e m p t s  t o  expel  Taiwan from t h e  ADB.  
1980, T i t l e  11, s e c  . 251 [Supplemental  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  A c t ,  
1002,  adding s e c .  27 t o  t h e  Asian Development Bank Act . I  
3 .  H a i t i .  The S e c r e a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  t h e  I D B  t o  work wi th  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  on t h e  I D B  
e x e c u t i v e  board from o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t o  encourage development o f  a  
c o o r d i n a t e d  economic development program t o  h e l p  H a i t i .  The Agency 
f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development i s  t o  c o o p e r a t e  i n  such an e f f o r t .  [FY 
1987 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u t i o n ,  s e c .  554.1 
4.  C h i l e .  It i s  t h e  Sense of  Congress t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  
should  oppose MDB a i d  t o  C h i l e ,  under terms of  s e c .  701 of  t h e  I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  Ac t ,  u n t i l  t h a t  c o u n t r y  ends  i t s  
p a t t e r n  of human r i g h t s  v i o l a t i o n s  and i n s t i t u t e s  democra t i c  p o l i t i c a l  
r e fo rms .  [FY 1987 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s o l u t i o n ,  s e c .  556. ]  
5 .  Aid t o  A f r i c a .  Congress found t h a t  Sub-Saharan A f r i c a  i s  faced 
w i t h  v e r y  s e r i o u s  economic c o n d i t i o n s  and t h a t  o n l y  a  combined e f f o r t  by 
t h e  ~ f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  themselves  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l - a i d  donors  c a n  overcome 
i t s  c u r r e n t  problems. Congress found t h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development 
A s s o c i a t i o n '  s  (IDA) S p e c i a l  F a c i l i t y  f o r  Sub-Saharan A f r i c a  was an  impor- 
t a n t  v e h i c l e  f o r  promoting t h e  needed p o l i c y  re fo rms  and c o o r d i n a t i n g  a i d  
and t h a t  i t  was i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e .  
Elsewhere i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  i t  a u t h o r i z e d  $ 2 2 5  m i l l i o n  (which had not 
been r e q u e s t e d  by  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n )  f o r  U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  
F a c i l i t y .  [ F u r t h e r  Cont inuing A p p r o r i a t i o n s  Ac t ,  1986, s e c  . 101. ] 
6. E l  Sa lvador  and Nicaragua.  It i s  t h e  Sense of Congress t h a t  
i n  p rov id ing  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  Nicaragua 
and E l  S a l v a d o r ,  t h e  b r l d  Bank should  encourage programs which a s s i s t  
t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and h e l p  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  economy o f  t h e  n a t i o n .  The 
U .  S.  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  Bank should  encourage such programs. 
[ P . L .  96-389 adding s e c .  38 t o  t h e  B r e t t o n  Woods Agreements Act . ]  
( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  nex t  page) 
O p p o s i t i o n  t o  C e r t a i n  Kinds o f  C o u n t r i e s  
1 .  E x p r o p r i a t i o n .  The P r e s i d e n t  i s  
t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks 
t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. Execu- 
t o  v o t e  a g a i n s t  a l l  l o a n s  t o  
c o u n t r i e s  which have e x p r o p r i a t e d  i n v e s t m e n t s  owned by U.S. c i t i z e n s  
o r  r e p u d i a t e d  c o n t r a c t s  wi th  U .  S. c i t i z e n s  o r  imposed d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
t a x e s  which have a  s i m i l a r  c o n f i s c a t o r y  e f f e c t ,  u n l e s s  a r rangements  
f o r  prompt,  a d e q u a t e ,  and e f f e c t i v e  c m p e n s a t i o n  have been  made o r  
good f a i t h  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  underway (Gonzalez  amendment). The v o t i n g  
power o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  a l s o  t o  b e  used i n  t h e  I D B  t o  d i s a p p r o v e  
any l o a n  from t h e  Fund f o r  S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  t o  a  c o u n t r y  i f  U.S. 
b i l a t e r a l  a i d  t o  t h a t  c o u n t r y  i s  suspended due t o  p r o v i s i o n s  of  t h e  
Hickenlooper  amendment, which b a r s  a i d  i n  c a s e s  of  uncompensated 
e x p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  U.S. i n v e s t m e n t s .  [ I 9 7 2  I D B  A c t ,  adding s e c .  21 t o  
1960 I D B  Act ;  I D A  I11 A c t ,  add ing  s e c .  12 , t o  1960 I D A  Act ;  1972 ADB 
Act ,  adding s e c .  18 t o  1966 ADB Act;  1976 AFDF Act ,  s e c .  210; 1965 
I D B  Act ,  adding s e c .  1 5 ( c )  t o  1959 I D B  Act] 
2. Drug t r a f f i c k i n g .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  i s  t o  i n s t r u c t  
t h e  U.S. Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  v o t e  a g a i n s t  
l o a n s  t o  a n y  c o u n t r y  whose government h a s  f a i l e d ,  i n  t h e  v i e w  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  t o  t a k e  adequa te  s t e p e  t o  p reven t  t h e  i l l e g a l  s a l e  o f  n a r -  
c o t i c s  o r  o t h e r  c o n t r o l l e d  s u b s t a n c e s  t o  U.S. Government p e r s o n n e l  
s t a t i o n e d  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y  o r  t o  p reven t  t h e  i l l e g a l  e n t r y  o f  such d r u g s  
from t h a t  c o u n t r y  i n t o  t h e  United S t a t e e  (Rangel amendment). [I972 
I D B  A c t ,  adding s e c .  22 t o  1959 I D B  Act ;  I D A  111 A c t ,  add ing  s e c .  1 3  
t o  1960 I D A  Act;  1972 ADB A c t ,  adding s e c .  19 t o  1966 ADB Act. Does 
no t  cover  AFDF o r  IFc] 
MDB Lending P o l i c i e s  
1 .  I n t e g r a t i o n  o f  women. The P r e e i d e n t  i s  r e q u e s t e d  t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  
u.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e i r  d u t i e s  
i n  ways t h a t  will encourage and p r a i o t e  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  women i n t o  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  economies o f  member and r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r i e s  and i n t o  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
and po l i cy -making  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  banks .  The P r e s i d e n t  i s  a l s o  asked 
t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  banks '  p r o g r e s s  i n  adop t ing  and implementing such p o l i c i e s  
o r  p r a c t i c e s  when making c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e s e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n c i e s  
( P e r c y  amendment). [FA Act of  1974,  adding s e c .  305 t o  FA Act of  19611 
2 .  M i l i t a r y  equipment .  The U.S. v o t i n g  power i n  t h e  I D B  i s  t o  
b e  used t o  d i s a p p r o v e  a n y  l o a n  which might a s s i s t  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  coun- 
t r y  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  t o  a c q u i r e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  o r  heavy m i l i t a r y  
equipment.  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  r e q ~ i r e d  t o  r e p o r t  a n n u a l l y  i n  t h e  NAC 
annual  r e p o r t  on L a t i n  American d e f e n s e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and s t e p s  t a k e n  b y  
I D B  members t o  r e s t r a i n  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and s t r e n g t h e n  f r e e  and 
democra t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  [ 1967 I D B  Ac t ,  add ing  s e c .  1 6 ( c )  t o  1959 I D B  
Act. 1970 I D B  Act ,  P.L. 91-599, s e c .  3 l ( l ) ,  f r e e s t a n d i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n . ]  
3 .  Ligh t  c a p i t a l  t echno logy .  The United S t a t e s  i s  t o  use  i t s  
v o i c e  and v o t e  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  promote t h e  development 
and u s e  o f  l i g h t  c a p i t a l  t e c h n o l o g i e s  a s  ma jor  f a c e t s  o f  t h e  i n t e r -  
( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  n e x t  page) 
n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s '  development s t r a t e g i e s .  Major emphasis i s  t o  
p laced on t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  and c o n s e r v a t i o n  of  ene rgy  through l i g h t  
c a p i t a l  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  In t h e  I D B ,  t h e  U.S. Execut ive  D i r e c t o r  i s  
d i r e c t e d  t o  propose  a  r e s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  Execu t ive  Board p rov id ing  f o r  
adop t ion  and use  o f  l i g h t  c a p i t a l  t echno logy  a s  a  major f a c e t  of t h e  
I D B ' s  development s t r a t e g y  ( ~ o n g  amendment). [IFI Act o f  1977, s e c .  
801;  1976 I D B  Act ,  adding s e c .  29 t o  1959 I D B  Act]  
MDBs and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade 
1 .  Compet i t ive  commodi t ies .  The U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  t h e  MDBs s h a l l  
oppose any l o a n  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  o r  expanding p roduc t ion  f o r  expor t  of palm 
o i l ,  s u g a r ,  o r  c i t r u s  c r o p s  i f  t h e  l o a n  w i l l  c ause  i n j u r y  t o  U.S. p roducers  
of  t h e  same, s i m i l a r  o r  competing a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodities (Mathis/Moore 
amendment). The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  i s  a l s o  t o  i n s t r u c t  U.S. r e p r e -  
s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  banks t o  oppose any a i d  f o r  t h e  p roduc t ion  of  any  commodity 
f o r  e x p o r t ,  i f  t h e  commodity i s  i n  s u r p l u s  on world markets  and t h e  a i d  
w i l l  c a u s e  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n j u r y  t o  U.S. producers  of  t h e  same, s i m i l a r  o r  
competing commodities (obey amendment). The P r e s i d e n t  i s  a l s o  d i r e c t e d  t o  
i n i t i a t e  wide i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  OECD and e l sewhere  concern-  
ing fo rmat ion  o f  v i a b l e  s t a n d a r d s  regard ing  use  of  development a i d  f o r  
p roduc t ion  o f  expor ted  commodi t ies ,  i n c l u d i n g  items i n  o v e r s u p p l y  on world 
marke t s  t h a t  migh t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  harm U.S. p roducers  o f  competing p r o d u c t s  
( S c h w i k e r  amendment). The Nat ional  Advisory Council  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Monetary and F i n a n c i a l  P o l i c i e s  (NAC) s h a l l  i n c l u d e  i n  i t s  annual  r e p o r t s  
a  l i s t  of  World Bank p r o j e c t  p roposa l s  t h a t  would enhance c o u n t r i e s '  capa-  
c i t y  t o  produce a  commodity f o r  e x p o r t  i f  t h a t  commodity i s  o r  w i l l  be  i n  
s u r p l u s  i n  world marke t s  and such a s s i s t a n c e  would c a u s e  i n j u r y  t o  U .  S. 
p roducers .  [ I F I  Act o f  1977,  s e c  . 9 0 l ( a )  ; F o r e i g n  A s s i s t a n c e  A p p r o p r i a t i o n  
Act of 1979,  s e c s .  609-610. Supplemental Appropr ia t ions  Act ,  1984,  s e c .  
813, adding s e c .  50 t o  t h e  B r e t t o n  Woods Agreements Act . ]  
2.  Copper and Meta l s  I n d u s t r i e s .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  s h a l l  
i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  a l l  t h e  MDBs t o  use t h e  v o t e  and 
v o i c e  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  oppose any a s s i s t a n c e  fo r  t h e  p roduc t ion  o f  
any copper  commodity f o r  e x p o r t  o r  f o r  the  expans ion  o r  improvement of  any 
copper  min ing ,  s m e l t i n g ,  o r  r e f i n i n g  c a p a c i t y .  The U.  S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  
t h e  PlDBs s h a l l  a l s o  t a k e  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t  i o n ,  i n  a s s e s s i n g  p r o s p e c t i v e  MDB 
l o a n s  t h a t  would expand o r  improve c o u n t r i e s '  c a p a c i t y  f o r  producing o r  
f a b r i c a t i n g  m i n e r a l s  and meta l  p r o d u c t s ,  m e r c i a l l y ,  whether t h e r e  i s  
s u r p l u s  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  and whether ( i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  a l s o  
a  producer of  t h e  i t  impor t s  more than h a l f  i t s  consunp t ion  o f  t h e  
p roduc t .  [Supplementa l  ~ p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Act,  1985, s e c .  501 and 5OZ(c) . ]  
3. Competing P r o d u c t s .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  
t h e  U.S.  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  MDBs t o  g i v e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  
c o u n t r y  economic ad jus tment  programs might  have on i n d i v i d u a l  i n d u s t r y  
s e c t o r s  and world canmodi ty  m a r k e t s ,  so a s  t o  minimize t h e  impact on world 
marke t s  and avoid government s u b s i d y  o f  e x p o r t s .  [Supplementa l  Appropri- 
a t i o n s  Act,  1985,  s e c  . 502(b) .  1 
( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  next  page) 
4 .  E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  Trade B a r r i e r s .  In  1986,  Congress adopted l e g i s -  
l a t i o n  which s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  MDBs would a l s o  b e  covered by t h e  
d i r e c t i v e s  i n  s e c .  49 of  t h e  B r e t t o n  kbods Agreements Act. A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  was d i r e c t e d  t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. r ep reuen-  
t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  MDBs: ( 1 )  t o  s e e k  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  wi th  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  o t h e r  governments about  ways t h e  MDB program cou ld  b e  used t o  r e d u c e  
o b s t a c l e s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  and inves tment  and t o  d i s c o u r a g e  
c o u n t r i e s  from pursu ing  u n f a i r  t r a d e  and inves tment  p r a c t i c e s ;  ( 2 )  t o  
urge t h e  Banks t o  use  t h e i r  l o a n  programs a s  mechanisms f o r  encourag ing  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s ;  t o  t a k e  c o u n t r i e s '  p r o g r e s s  i n  
t h i s  a r e a  i n  account  a s  t h e  U. S. d e t e r m i n e s  i t s  p o s i t i o n  on s p e c i f i c  
l o a n  r e q u e s t s ;  and ( 3 )  t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  r e l e v a n t  commit tees  o f  Congress 
i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  s u p p o r t s  MDB l o a n s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  which have no t  
ach ieved  t h e  t a r g e t s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g e n c i e s  have s e t  f o r  them f o r  
r e d u c t i o n s  i n  import  b a r r i e r s .  [ M  1987 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o n t i n u i n g  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  s e c  , 555. ] 
5 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  on MDB Expor t  O p p o r t u n i t i e s .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  
Treasury  s h a l l  a s s u r e  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  e x p o r t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
from m u l t i l a t e r a l  bank l e n d i n g  s h a l l  be t r a n s m i t t e d  prompt ly  t o  t h e  
S t a t e  and Commerce Depar tments .  A sys tem f o r  broad d e s s e m i n a t i o n  of  
t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  l a r g e  and s m a l l  b u s i n e s s e s  s h a l l  be  d e v i s e d .  
[IF1 Act of 1980, T i t l e  IV] 
Bank I n t e r n a l  Management O p e r a t i o n s  
1. Audi t s  and e v a l u a t i o n s .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  i s  t o  
i n s t r u c t  t h e  U.S. Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r  a t  t h e  I D B  t o  s e e k  fo rmat ion  o f  
a n  autonomous e v a l u a t i o n  u n i t  i n  t h e  I D B .  A l so ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  
d i r e c t e d  t o  p ropose ,  th rough  t h e  U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  t h e  World 
Bank and ADB, f o r m a t i o n  o f  s i m i l a r  e v a l u a t i o n  u n i t s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  
m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  examine and r e v i e w  t h e  programs and a c t i v i t i e s  
of  each  agency and r e p o r t  t h e i r  f i n d i n g s  t o  t h e i r  Execu t ive  Boards 
f o r  t r a n s m i t t a l  t o  member c o u n t r y  government 8 (Se lden  amendments) . 
[1967 I D B  Act, add ing  s e c .  14 t o  1959 I D B  Ac t ;  FA Act o f  1973,  add ing  
s e c .  3O2(e) ( 2 )  t o  t h e  FA Act of 19611 
2. Access t o  l o a n  d a t a .  No U . S s  funds  may b e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  any 
mul t  i f a t e r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  whose U .  S. i e p r e s e n t a t i v e  c a n n o t ,  upon r e -  
q u e s t ,  o b t a i n  d a t a  on t h e  amounts aad names o f  bor rowers  f o r  a l l  
l o a n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  l o a n s  t o  employees ,  and t h e  compensat ion and r e l a -  
t ed  b e n e f i t s  o f  bank employees .  [ F ~ r e i g n  A s s i s t a n c e  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  
Act of  1977,  1978,  and 1979, s e c .  6051 
3 .  Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r '  s a l a r i e s ,  No U .  S. c o n t r i b u t i o n  may b e  
made t o  a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  bank whose U.S. Execut ive  D i r e c t o r  and A l t e r -  
n a t e  Execu t ive  D i r e c t o r  r e c e i v e ,  i n c l u d i n g  any supp lementa l  compen- 
s a t i o n  from t h e  U. S. Government, s a l a r i e s  i n  e x c e s s  of  t h o s e  p rov i -  
ded f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  occupying l e v e l s  IV and V ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  o f  t h e  
U. S. Government's e x e c u t i v e  s c h e d u l e .  [ F o r e i g n  A s s i s t a n c e  Appropri-  
a t i o n s  Act o f  1978 and 1979, T i t l e  1111 
( t a b l e  c o n t i n u e s  n e x t  page) 
4.  S t a f f  s a l a r i e s .  The P r e s i d e n t  i s  t o  d i r e c t  t h e  U.S. Execut ive  
D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  banks t o  t a k e  a l l  a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n s  
t o  keep t h e  s a l a r i e s  and b e n e f i t s  o f  bank employees t o  l e v e l s  
comparable t o  t h o s e  o f  employees o f  p r i v a t e  b u s i n e s s  and the  U.S. 
Government i n  comparable p o s i t i o n s  (Helms amendment). [ IFI Act of  
1977, s e c .  7041 
5 .  Removal o f  MDB s t a f f .  Congress s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  p o l i c y  
of  t h e  United S t a t e s  t h a t  no e f f o r t s  s h a l l  b e  made t o  r e p l a c e  o r  remove 
s t a f f  members o f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  development banks ,  o n  account  o f  t h e  i n d i -  
v i d u a l s '  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y  o r  a c t i v i t i e s .  The S e c r e t a r y  of  t h e  
Treasury  must c o n s u l t  wi th  t h e  chairmen and ranking members o f  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  and a p p r o p r i a t i o n  c m i t t e e s  and subcommittees 
b e f o r e  under tak ing  any e  f f o r t  . [Supplementa l  ~ p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Act o f  
1984,  s e c .  1006.1 
6 .  Reports  on E f f e c t s  of  MDB A c t i v i t y .  The NAC annual  r e p o r t  s h a l l  
d i s c u s s  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  e a c h  MDB l o a n  approved o r  o u t s t a n d i n g ,  i n c l u d i n g  
a  p r o g r e s s  r e p o r t  on t h e  p r o j e c t s  covered by e a c h  l o a n  and d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
how each w i l l  b e n e f i t  t h e  people  of  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r y .  The NAC annual  
r e p o r t  s h a l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  p rocedures  which exempt t h e  
World Bank and I D B  from U.S. banking laws and how t h e  banks '  o p e r a t i o n s  
a s s i t  i n  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  d e v e l o p e n t  of  t h e i r  member c o u n t r i e s .  [IDB Act 
of  1970, P. L. 599,  s e c  3 1 ( 1 ) ,  f r e e s t a n d i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n .  B r e t t o n  hbods 
Agreement Ac t ,  s e c .  1 5 ( b ) .  I D B  Act of  1959, s e c .  12.1 
Other  C r i t e r i a  
1 .  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n  and M I A s .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Treasury  
i s  a l s o  t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  U .  S. Execut ive  D i r e c t o r s  a t  t h e  banks t o  
c o n s i d e r ,  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e i r  d u t i e s :  
A. k'hether t h e  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r y  h a s  d e t o n a t e d  a  n u c l e a r  d e v i c e  
o r  i s  a  S t a t e  P a r t y  t o  t h e  N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  T r e a t y ,  o r  b o t h ,  a n d ,  
B.  Whether, f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  Vietnam, Laos ,  and Cambodia, 
t h e  government o f  each  c o u n t r y  h a s  been r e s p o n s i v e  i n  p rov id ing  a  
more s u b s t a n t i a l  accoun t ing  o f  Americans miss ing  i n  a c t i o n .  [IFI 
Act of  1977, s e c .  7 0 1 ( b ) ( 3 4 ) ]  
2 .  C o n s u l t a t i o n s  wi th  Congress .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
s h a l l  c o n s u l t  wi th  t h e  chairmen and rank ing  m i n o r i t y  members of  t h e  
a u t h o r i z i n g  and a p p r o p r i a t i n g  commietees and subcommittees b e f o r e ,  
d u r i n g ,  and a t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  any MDB funding n e g o t i a t i o n s  which 
might i n v o l v e  f u t u r e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from t h e  United S t a t e s .  [ 1981 
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  Ac t ,  adding s e c .  1201 t o  t h e  IF1 Act of  19771 
Ae PENDIX 2 .  
BASIC LAWS GOVERNING U .  S. 
PART ICIPATLON I N  THE MDBS* 
1. B r e t t o n  Woods Agreements Act .  P.L. 79-171, approved J u l y  31, 1945. 
(Author ized  U .  S.  membership i n  I B R D  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund.) 
2 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F inance  C ~ r p o r a t i o n  Act .  P . L .  84-350, approved August 1 1 ,  
1955.  (Author ized  U .  S. membership i n  t h e  IFC.) 
3 .  Inter-American Development Bank Act .  P.L. 86-147, approved August 7 ,  
1959.  (Author ized  U.S. membership i n  t h e  IDB.) 
4 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development A s s o c i a t i o n  Act .  P.L. 86-565, approved June 3 0 ,  
1960. (Author ized  U .  S. membership i n  t h e  IDA.) 
5. Asian Development Bank Ac t .  P.L.89-369, approved March 16 ,  1966,  
(Author ized  U.S. membership i n  t h e  ADB.) 
6 .  A f r i c a n  Development Fund Act .  P.L. 94-302, approved May 31,  1976. 
(Author ized  U.S. membership i n  t h e  AFDF.) 
7 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  Act o f  1977. P.L. 95-1 18,  approved 
October  3,  1977. ( ~ n a c t e d  s e v e r a l  d i r e c t i v e s  govern ing  U.S. v o t e s  o r  
p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  MDBs a s  a  whole.) 
8 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  Act of 1980. [ i n f o r m a l  t i t l e ]  
P.L. 96-259, approved J u n e  3 ,  1980. (Enacted s e v e r a l  d i r e c t i v e s  govern-  
i n g  U.S. v o t e s  o r  procedures  f o r  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  MDBs.) 
9 .  A f r i c a n  Developnent Bank Act .  P.L. 97-35, approved August 13,  1981. 
(Author ized  U.  S. membership i n  t h e  AFDB.) 
10 .  F o r e i g n  A s a i r t a n c e  Act o f  1961. P.L. 87-195, approved September 4 ,  1961. 
(Th ie  i s  t h e  b a s i c  law f o r  t h e  U.S. b i l a t e r a l  a i d  program. On o c c a s i o n ,  
n o t a b l y  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development and Food A s s i s t a n c e  Act o f  1978, i t  
h a s  been amended t o  s t i p u l a t e  what U . S .  p o l i c y  s h a l l  b e  on c e r t a i n  i s s u e s  
a l s o  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  MDB program .) 
' *  I n  g e n e r a l ,  most  new l a w  a f f e c t i n g  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  MDBs t a k e s  
t h e  form of  amendments adding new s e c t i o n s  t o  t h e s e  b a s i c  a c t s .  O c c a s i o n a l l y ,  
Congress h a s  adopted f r e e s t a n d i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  MDB a u t h o r i z a t i o n  a c t  s  (new 
laws t h i c h  d o  no t  amend t h e  p r i o r  MDB a c t s )  h i c h  a f f e c t  U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  t h e  MDBs .  The most i m p o r t a n t  of  t h e s e  ( t h e  I F 1  Acts  o f  1977 and 1980) 
a r e  c i t e d  h e r e .  F r e e s t a n d i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  h a s  a l s o  been e n a c t e d  t h r o u g h  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  a c t s .  These a r e  c i t e d  i n  Appendix 1 but n o t  l i s t e d  h e r e .  
